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Abstract
In attempting to understand the effectiveness of the Security and Exchange Commission’s
(”SEC”) Memoranda of Understanding (”MOU”), this Note proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the structure of the global marketplace and evaluates the prospects for cooperation. Part II
looks at the U.S. court system’s approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction and reviews some representative MOUs. Part III concludes that MOUs are primed for success as an information exchange
framework, though an evaluation of their effectiveness should be carried out by the SEC or another
body with access to confidential files obtained from foreign regulators.

NOTE
REVISITING THE SEC’S MEMORANDA OF
UNDERSTANDING:
A FRESH LOOK
Eduard H. Cadmus
INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
brought billionaire Allen Stanford to trial for investor fraud.1
Although he surrendered to federal law enforcement within the
United States,2 his influence abroad could have been an
unfortunate frustration for the SEC.3 As a financier, Stanford
controlled banks across the Caribbean and Latin America.4 But it
 J.D. Candidate, 2011, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. Economics,
Politics, 2008, New York University. The author would like to thank Professors Steven
Thel and Eric Jensen for their input and advice, and his family for encouraging him to
pursue a legal education.
1. See Clifford Krauss et al., Texas Firm Accused of $8 Billion Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
18, 2009, at A1 (“[T]he Securities and Exchange Commission, in a civil suit, said Mr.
Stanford and two colleagues fraudulently peddled to scores of investors.”); Graeme
Wearden, Allen Stanford Indicted on Fraud Charges After Surrendering to FBI, GUARDIAN
(London), June 19, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/19/allenstanford-arrested (“In February, [the SEC] . . . alleged that he fraudulently sold $8bn
(£4.7bn) in certificates . . . .”).
2. See Wearden, supra note 1 (“Stanford, 59, had been staying at his girlfriend’s
home in Fredericksburg, 50 miles south of Washington, but left the premises to speak
with FBI agents who were parked outside, according to his lawyer.”); see also Zachary A.
Goldfarb & Anita Kumar, Stanford, 5 Associates Charged With Running $7 Billion Ponzi
Scheme, WASH. POST, June 20, 2009, at A11 (“Stanford, 59, surrendered to FBI agents at
his girlfriend’s house in Fredericksburg, Va., Thursday night.”).
3. See Krauss et al., supra note 1 (“On the tiny island of Antigua, Mr. Stanford’s
presence was both large and controversial”); see also Tom Leonard, An Island Bowled over
by a Master of Spin; Sir Allen Stanford’s Lavish Spending Turned Antigua into His Very Own
Theme Park, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 21, 2009, at 23 (“The sums of money the
Texan was willing to splash around would have caused ripples even in a rich country, but
on an island of 70,000 people the Allen Stanford largesse crashed over like a tidal
wave.”).
4. See Daniel Cancel & Matthew Walter, Venezuela takes over Local Bank Owned by
Stanford, CARIBBEAN NET NEWS, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.caribbeannetnews.com/
venezuela/venezuela.php?news_id=14384&start=0&category_id=12 (“In addition to
Venezuela, Stanford operated affiliates in Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and
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was in Antigua, Stanford’s adopted home, where his influence
was at its peak.
The island had a gross domestic product smaller than
Stanford’s personal fortune.5 He poured money into both the
island’s development and, correspondingly, the government’s
pockets.6 In response, the Antiguan government knighted
Stanford.7 His alleged bribes of Antiguan financial regulators8
may yet hamper the SEC’s efforts to extract evidence and
information from Antiguan control. For example, the head of
Antigua’s regulator already attempted to throw the SEC off of its
investigation of Stanford before his arrest.9
Potential difficulties in discovering and investigating
misconduct abroad are well illustrated, though perhaps at an
extreme, by Stanford’s situation. The SEC has to deal with these
and other complexities that hamper effective cooperation when
investigating transnational transgressions. In response, the
Panama . . . .”); Profile: Allen Stanford, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Nov. 2, 2008, at 21
(“Allen opened offices in Latin America and the Caribbean.”).
5. See Jenny Booth & Hannah Strange, Allen Stanford Fraud Charges Trigger Panic
and Run on His Banks, TIMES (London), Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/
tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article5760612.ece (discussing Stanford as the largest
employer and investor in Antigua and the possible catastrophic effects of the charges
against him); Profile: Allen Stanford, supra note 4 (stating that Stanford’s “[US]$2.2
billion (£1.4 billion) fortune . . . dwarfs the GDP of Antigua and Barbuda.”).
6. See Goldfarb & Kumar, supra note 2 (discussing Stanford’s extensive holdings in
Antigua); Leonard, supra note 3; see also Jacqueline Charles, Billionaire Stanford’s Troubles
Cause a Tropical Headache on Antigua, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 22, 2009, at A1 (discussing
Stanford’s celebrity status, donations and sponsorships, and his knighthood granted by
Antigua).
7. See Leonard, supra note 3 (“After he took dual US and Antiguan-Barbudan
citizenship, the islands gave him a knighthood.”); Krauss et al., supra note 1.
8. See Goldfarb & Kumar, supra note 2 (stating that bribes to the Antiguan
regulator were both cash and in-kind); Krauss et al., supra note 1 (“[Stanford] was
viewed by many as cozying up with key politicians to win their favor.”); Robert Khuzami,
Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC, Speech by SEC Staff: Statement at News
Conference Announcing Additional Charges in Stanford Ponzi Scheme Case (June 19,
2009),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch061909rk.htm
[hereinafter
Khuzami Speech] (stating that the Antiguan regulator was “bought and paid for [by
Stanford] with bribes and corruption”).
9. See Goldfarb & Kumar, supra note 2 (“The indictment charges that [the
Antiguan regulator] gave confidential information about an SEC inquiry to Stanford,
which enabled him to deceive the SEC about the bank’s finances and the level of
oversight conducted by Antiguan authorities.”); Khuzami Speech, supra note 8 (stating
that the Antiguan regulator’s assurances to the SEC “were just more Stanford lies,
dressed-up in the letterhead of a supposedly impartial bank regulator who had in fact
been bought and paid for with bribes and corruption”).
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agency has been signing informal Memoranda of Understanding
(“MOU”) with foreign regulators for over two decades in an
attempt to circumvent barriers to international cooperation and
information sharing.10
These agreements are more important now than ever
before. Markets across the globe are rising to challenge U.S.
financial supremacy,11 providing increasing opportunities for
U.S. citizens to be defrauded abroad and for U.S. firms to engage
in misconduct supposedly beyond the SEC’s ability to
meaningfully scrutinize.12 MOUs partake in the solution to this
problem by expanding the SEC’s ability to investigate
internationally. They do this by providing a fundamental
framework for interactions between two regulators, allowing
them to request information pursuant to a mutually determined
procedure and anticipate cooperation in return.13 Alternatively
stated, the SEC can obtain information about misconduct outside
the United States through MOUs concluded with regulators that
have jurisdictional access to the desired information.14
Accordingly, MOUs appear to effectively promote investigatory
cooperation,15 though confidentiality provisions surrounding the
documents limit meaningful study.16
The agreements are a response to changing conditions in
the global financial marketplace.17 MOUs may also represent one
facet of an effort by the United States to counter its slip from
dominance.18 As a tool to promote information-gathering

10. See infra notes 200–204 and accompanying text (discussing the background of
Memoranda of Understanding (“MOU”)).
11. See infra Part I.B (reviewing current conditions in global financial markets).
12. See infra Part I.B (reviewing current conditions in global financial markets).
13. See infra Part II.C (discussing MOUs as cooperative frameworks).
14. See infra Part II.B (discussing MOUs’ structure and provisions).
15. See infra Parts III.A–B (discussing elements of MOUs that make them effective).
16. See infra Part III.C (discussing confidentiality provisions applicable to MOUs).
17. See infra notes 44–47 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC’s
acknowledgment of the need for international cooperation and that the SEC has been
attempting to improve its regulatory regime).
18. See infra notes 44–47 and accompanying text (discussing SEC’s
acknowledgment of the need for international cooperation and that the SEC has been
attempting to improve its regulatory regime); infra Part I.B.2–4 (discussing U.S.
competitiveness and regulations).
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cooperation, MOUs mitigate some of the factors harming U.S.
competitiveness within capital markets.19
In attempting to discover and understand the effectiveness
of the SEC’s MOUs, this Note will proceed in three Parts. Part I
examines the structure of the global marketplace and evaluates
the prospects for cooperation. Part II looks at the U.S. court
system’s approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction and reviews
some representative MOUs. Part III concludes that MOUs are
primed for success as an information exchange framework,
though an evaluation of their effectiveness should be carried out
by the SEC or another body with access to confidential files
obtained from foreign regulators.
I.

MARKET TRENDS AND STRUCTURE

From an unchallenged, post-World War II high as the
preeminent global financial leader, the United States’ status is,
and has been, under threat from several rising competitor
financial centers. The erosion of U.S. dominance in global
capital-raising is an inevitable result of the development of other
states, including the departure of Europe from the U.S. financial
umbrella.20 Although this trend has been clear since the 1980s,
some potential to retard or reverse it lies in international
enforcement cooperation, particularly as markets—and more
importantly their effects—become progressively transnational.21
Prospects for international cooperation in securities
regulation are affected by the growing number and importance
of non-U.S. actors and the variations between their securities
laws.22 Although harmonizing all states’ securities laws would
smooth out differences between relevant jurisdictions, no
consensus or constituency exists for such an undertaking.23
Instead, less formal arrangements, such as the SEC’s MOUs, are
more plausible mechanisms for promoting international
securities enforcement cooperation.24
19. See infra Part II.B (describing MOU provisions that open up new sources of
enforcement information for the SEC).
20. See infra Part I.A (discussing historical changes in global financial markets).
21. See id.
22. See infra Parts I.A–B (reviewing current conditions in global financial markets
and how they have changed).
23. See infra notes 210–214 and accompanying text (discussing MOUs as soft law).
24. See id.
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In order to better understand the environment within which
MOUs are operating and to which they are structured to
respond, Part 1.A presents a brief historical overview of
international financial developments. Part I.B then examines
current conditions in the global marketplace, including U.S.
competitiveness, and looks at the International Organization for
Securities Commissions. Finally, Part I.C discusses the feasibility
of international cooperation within this environment.
A. Historical Overview
After World War I, the United States, even as a major global
power, passed on the opportunity to influence the post-war
global structure, but it had a second opportunity to take the lead
in creating a new comprehensive global system after World War
II.25 In 1945, the ravages of war left the other advanced and
potential competitor states physically destroyed and struggling to
rebuild their exhausted economies, while U.S. territory remained
unscathed.26
U.S. leadership manifested itself in the creation of a new,
formalized global economic order: the Bretton Woods system.27
25. See Colum Gavan Duffy, The League of Nations, 78 THE IRISH MONTHLY 166, 173–
74 (1950) (“[I]f the United States had not refused to become a member of the League
of Nations from the beginning, it is possible that . . . this great international experiment
would have been more successful . . . .”); Barry Eichengreen & Peter B. Kenen,
Managing the World Economy Under the Bretton Woods System: An Overview, in MANAGING
THE WORLD ECONOMY: FIFTY YEARS AFTER BRETTON WOODS 3, 9 (Peter B. Kenen ed.,
1994) (“The failure of . . . initiatives can be attributed to a combination of
circumstances, prominent among which was the recalcitrance of the United States.”). By
declining to cooperate, the United States largely condemned to failure efforts at
structuring international interaction by the European powers. See Duffy, supra;
Eichengreen & Kenen, supra.
26. See Donald C. Langevoort, Foreword: United States Securities Regulation and Global
Competition, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 191, 194 (2008) (discussing U.S. advantages compared
to Europe and Japan after World War II); Raymond Vernon, The United States Government
at Bretton Woods and After, in THE BRETTON WOODS-GATT SYSTEM: RETROSPECT AND
PROSPECT AFTER FIFTY YEARS 52, 58 (Orin Kirschner ed., 1996) (explaining the United
States’ formidable economic might after World War II).
27. See ARMAND VAN DORMAEL, BRETTON WOODS: BIRTH OF A MONETARY SYSTEM
286 (1978) (stating that by the end of 1945, thirty-four nations had ratified the Bretton
Woods agreements); Rolf W. Weber & Douglas W. Arner, Toward a New Design for
International Financial Regulation, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 391, 391 (2007) (discussing the
vision for Bretton Woods to “redevelop and reintegrate”the world economy). The
Bretton Woods system was strongly shaped by U.S. preferences. See VAN DORMAEL, supra
at 29–95 (discussing how the implementation and structure of Bretton Woods was
altered by the United States by using “bulldozer tactics,” locating the IMF and World
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Bretton Woods was conceived as a series of international
organizations and agreements to promote international financial
and commercial cooperation and stability.28 With the
establishment of Bretton Woods, the United States maneuvered
itself into the center of the new world order—politically,
geographically, and, most importantly, financially. The Bretton
Woods system focused on domestic restrictions. States’ currencies
were tied to the U.S. dollar at fixed rates in order to promote
financial stability.29 These and other domestic restrictions were
expected to produce the desired international commercial
stability, overseen by the international organizations constituting
Bretton Woods system.30 As international finance grew in
importance and complexity throughout the decades following
the war, Bretton Woods was increasingly stressed. The system,
however, was designed with enough flexibility to adapt to
changing conditions and maintain itself.31 It survives today, in
part, through the International Monetary Fund.
Through this time, the United States’ economic dominance
has slipped, though it still commands an impressive share of
global capital-raising income.32 These troubles are partly the
Bank in Washington, D.C. and detailing a “personal decision” by the U.S. Treasury
Secretary to preempt the desires of a majority of Bretton Woods delegations); see also
Vernon, supra note 26 (explaining the wide array of options for the United States to
achieve through its economic muscle).
28. See Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Bretton Woods and International Cooperation, 23
FOREIGN AFF. 182, 182 (1945) (“For [Bretton Woods] took the first, the most vital and
the most difficult step toward putting into effect the sort of international economic
program which will be necessary for preserving the peace and creating favorable
conditions for world prosperity.”); John W. Pehle, The Bretton Woods Institutions, 55 YALE
L.J. 1127, 1129 (1946) (stating that one of the goals of Bretton Woods was to “reduce
obstacles to international trade and in other ways promote mutually advantageous
international commercial relations”).
29. See Weber & Arner, supra note 27, at 395 (“The essential underlying theory . . .
was based, first, on a system of stable exchange rates.”); Eichengreen & Kenen, supra
note 25, at 13 (“[M]embers of the IMF were required to peg their currencies to gold or
to the dollar (which was pegged to gold at [US]$35 an ounce).”).
30. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
31. See Weber & Arner, supra note 27, at 391 (“While international finance began
to reemerge soon after World War II . . . , due to the Bretton Woods’ focus on fixed
exchange rates . . . , there were no corresponding efforts directed towards its regulation,
leaving the matter to domestic law.”); see also Eichengreen & Kenen, supra note 25, at 4
(“[T]he postwar institutional order was not just sturdy but remarkably adaptable. It was
sufficiently flexible to cope with unanticipated events and rectify mistakes . . . .”).
32. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 29 (2006), available at
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result of newly-risen competitor financial centers attracting some
of the United States’ global share of capital-raising. Competitor
markets have been restructuring and rebranding themselves into
globally appealing entities.33 For example, the European Union
(“EU”) has implemented the Financial Services Action Plan
(“FSAP”), which attempts to reduce regulatory costs for investors
by harmonizing securities law across Europe.34 The change in
global finance can be characterized simply: companies looking to
raise capital now have a meaningful choice when deciding which
state’s financial system is best suited for their needs.35 In the past
they would have had only one feasible option: to come to the
United States.36
But blame for the United States’ relative decline does not lie
solely in other jurisdictions. Although it would have been
unrealistic to expect the United States to maintain indefinitely
such a disproportionate and uncontested lead in global finance,
certain aspects of the U.S. finance industry have accelerated its
slip.37 Fundamentally, the U.S. financial market is no longer

http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf
[hereinafter INTERIM REPORT] (showing the decline of capital raised in the United
States); Ingo Walter, Financial Integration Across Borders and Across Sectors: Implications for
Regulatory Structures, in FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN EUROPE 15, 46 (Jereon J.M. Kremers
et al. eds., 2003) (identifying “the current US market share as roughly 65 per cent in
global capital-raising and corporate advisory revenues”).
33. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at 39–41 (discussing changes in competitor
markets such as “an increase in the integrity of and trust in major foreign public markets
resulting from more transparency and better disclosure”); see also Walter, supra note 32,
at 42–43 (explaining that Europe makes less distinction between financial firms and is
more unified within national systems).
34. See Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, Is There a Uniform EU Securities Law after the
Financial Services Action Plan?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 43–44, 74 (2008) (discussing
FSAP and its uniformity goals); European Commission, Financial Services: Implementing
the Framework for Financial Markets, at 3, COM (1999) 232 Final (May 1999), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index/action_en.pdf
(1999) [hereinafter FSAP] (discussing the European move to a single market and
FSAP’s goals within that framework).
35. See Langevoort, supra note 26, at 193 (citing Dubai, London, and Hong Kong as
examples of New York’s competitors); see also INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at x–xi
(describing the difference between the past and current options of capital raising firms).
36. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at 29 (“The United States Public Equity
Market is Losing Competitiveness to Foreign and Private Markets[.]”); see also
Langevoort, supra note 26, at 193 (“[C]apital market transactions are increasingly based
in London, Hong Kong or Dubai, rather than in New York.”).
37. See discussion infra notes 39–43 (discussing the importance of retail investors in
the United States).

2010]

REVISITING THE SEC’S MOU

1807

dominant enough to draw undivided attention in spite of
regulation more cumbersome than that of its competitors.38
The U.S. investment market is comprised to a unique
degree of individual investors, known as retail investors.39 These
small and unsophisticated participants have pushed for a
different approach to regulation in order to protect themselves.40
As a result of this popular participation, the U.S. regulatory
regime is much more prone to overreaction in response to
financial downturns, as elected officials respond to their
constituent investors’ fury.41 Widespread financial market
participation often acts to push the U.S. government, acting to
protect relatively unsophisticated investors, away from the level of
regulation that would best attract firms to the United States.42
The end result is that other states see the U.S. system as a
labyrinth of high costs.43
38. See Langevoort, supra note 26, at 196 (“[T]he United States no longer has rents
that can compensate for—and thus mask—any suboptimal regulation.”); see also
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at x–xi (“U.S. financial markets need to attract business
that has a choice, and therefore how our markets are regulated by rules and laws really
does matter today.”).
39. See Langevoort, supra note 26, at 204 (“But globally, few if any other countries
have a similarly retail-driven approach.”); see also Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A
Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 31, 41 (2007) (“Today, more than half of all U.S. households are invested in
the stock market, either directly or through mutual funds and pension schemes.”).
40. See Langevoort, supra note 26, at 204 (“U.S. securities regulation truly is in a
bind. It has been built over the last seventy-five years largely to promote the interests of
retail investors, and the political demand for regulatory responses after every scandal
reminds us of this.”); Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the
Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1025–26 (2009)
(discussing the SEC’s historical focus on the need to protect retail investors).
41. See Langevoort, supra note 26, at 204 (“The common theme is relatively easy to
spot. U.S. securities regulation truly is in a bind. It has been built over the last seventyfive years largely to promote the interests of retail investors, and the political demand
for regulatory responses after every scandal reminds us of this.”); Langevoort, supra note
40, at 1025–26 (explaining how SEC rule making can be driven by popular outcry in
response to scandals and crashes).
42. See Langevoort, supra note 26, at 192, 204 (“[A] demand for tough, intense
regulation has been persistent for most of the past decade . . . .”); see also Walter, supra
note 32, at 46 (discussing problems of overregulation and underregulation).
43. See Walter, supra note 32, at 41 (“Regulation in the USA is carried out through
a crazy quilt of agencies . . . .”); see also INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at x–xi (“U.S.
financial markets need to attract business that has a choice, and therefore how our
markets are regulated by rules and laws really does matter today.” (emphasis added)).
Interestingly, other nations are beginning to follow the U.S. lead of securities ownership
by individuals, as opposed to large institutional investors, indicating a possible future
change in regulatory attitudes and priorities. See Luigi Guiso et al., Household Stockholding
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But this does not all lead to a foregone conclusion. The
United States may yet recapture definitive control of the global
conversation about international finance; there currently exists a
dearth of clear leadership in transnational securities
enforcement.44 Perhaps in response, SEC Chairman Mary
Schapiro, in an address to the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”), emphasized that the SEC is
attempting to become a more effective securities regulator within
the global system.45 But in a nod to the rise in importance of
other regions, she acknowledged the need for regulators to work
together in meeting the challenges created by the ever-increasing
internationalization of finance markets.46 The United States has
been building momentum to find ways to make securities
regulation and enforcement more effective at home and, more
relevantly, abroad.47

in Europe: Where Do We Stand and Where Do We Go?, 18 ECON. POL’Y 123, 125 (2003) (“[A]
much larger proportion of [European] investors now hold stocks in their portfolio.”);
Tafara & Peterson, supra note 39, at 41 (“[T]rends in Europe and elsewhere follow this
[U.S.] pattern, with retail investors more willing than in the past to put their savings into
the capital market, rather than in safer but comparatively low-return bank savings
accounts.”).
44. See C. Fred Bergsten, Managing the World Economy of the Future, in MANAGING
THE WORLD ECONOMY: FIFTY YEARS AFTER BRETTON WOODS 341, 349 (Peter B. Kenen
ed., 1994) (“Filling the present leadership vacuum is one of the most crucial challenges
facing the system as it enters the 21st century.”); Joseph A. Greenwald, Regionalism,
Multilateralism, and American Leadership, in THE BRETTON WOODS-GATT SYSTEM:
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT AFTER FIFTY YEARS, supra note 26, at 270, 281 (“No single
power or group of countries has moved up to take the place of the United States.”).
45. See Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Speech by SEC Chairman at 34th Annual
IOSCO [Int’l Org. of Securities Comm’ns] Conference: Improving the Role of the
Securities Regulators in a Changing Global Financial System (June 11, 2009), available at
http://sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch061109mls.htm [hereinafter Schapiro Speech]
(“You might say that, in the U.S., we are attempting to do exactly what this panel is
slated to discuss: ‘Improving the Role of [a] Securities Regulator in a Changing Global
Financial System.’”).
46. See id. (discussing the interconnectedness of markets and the new importance
of international securities enforcement).
47. See Margaret E. Tahyar, Final Report of the Securities Law Subcommittee of the Task
Force on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the International Bar Association, 2009 PLI/CORP. L. &
PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 685, 701 (“For the first time, the United States has
expressed a serious willingness to explore alternatives to a nationally based securities
regulatory regime in favour of greater coordination with foreign regulators . . . .”); see
also Roberta S. Karmel, The EU Challenge to the SEC, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1692, 1711
(2008) (“The SEC can no longer take a unilateralist approach to securities regulation
and assume the U.S. markets will remain the premier capital markets.”).
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Challenges to coordination in securities regulation and
enforcement may be overcome by favoring less formalized
arrangements. The structure of the U.S. government, namely its
separation of powers, makes it difficult for the United States to
credibly commit itself to binding agreements and initiatives.48
These same structural problems threatened U.S. success and
participation in the Bretton Woods negotiations and remain
relevant today in international cooperation efforts.49 Binding
arrangements, however, may not be necessary to secure
meaningful coordination in the field of securities enforcement.50
Non-enforceable alternatives, such as MOUs, may sidestep
constitutional and other internal agreement-approval processes.
B.

Current Conditions

Major financial markets today have significant international
participation. For example, in 2005 the New York Stock
Exchange (“NYSE”) had a total capitalization of US$21 trillion
dollars, of which over a third came from foreign firms.51 This
percentage has increased over the last few decades, illustrating

48. See H. Bockleman, The Need for Worldwide Coordination of Economic Policies, in
FINANCING THE WORLD ECONOMY IN THE NINETIES 39, 46 (Jac J. Sijben ed., 1989)
(explaining that the “constitutional role of Congress” impairs the ability of the United
States to commit itself); Vernon, supra note 26, at 52–53 (explaining that the structure
of U.S. government encourages the promulgation of ideas, but also that these ideas must
run a gauntlet of checks and balances).
49. See Bockleman, supra note 48, at 46; Vernon, supra note 26, at 52–53 (“The
Bretton Woods agreement itself was a race against declining U.S. public opinion and
against possible rejection by Congress”); VAN DORMAEL, supra note 27, at 286 (observing
that Congressional approval required the “most high-powered propaganda campaign in
. . . history”); see also John S. Odell, From London to Bretton Woods; Sources of Change in
Bargaining Strategies and Outcomes, 8 J. OF PUB. POL’Y 287, 303–04 (1988) (discussing the
careful considerations that went into securing approval of Bretton Woods in the United
States, including “a stunning national campaign to ‘stimulate public interest, crystallize
public opinion, and make that opinion vocal.’”).
50. See infra Part II.B (discussing the advantages of soft law arrangements).
51. See Tafara & Peterson, supra note 39, at 34 (“In terms of market capitalization,
these 450 foreign private issuers had a total market capitalization of $7.9 trillion at the
end of 2005, or 37% of the NYSE’s total $21.2 trillion market capitalization.”); Letter
from Mary Yeager, Assistant Sec’y, N.Y. Stock Exch., to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC
(Mar. 10, 2006), available at http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71205/myeager031006.pdf
(“Currently, there are 453 foreign companies from 47 countries listed on the NYSE . . .
represent[ing] over 37% of the total market value of NYSE-listed companies and over $8
trillion in total global market capitalization.”).
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the accelerating international focus of global financial markets.52
Correspondingly, U.S. retail investors now go abroad in
increasing numbers for their investment needs, in part due to
U.S. markets’ loss of global competitiveness and considerable
opportunities to invest abroad.53
But serious problems with and challenges to the
internationalization of financial markets exist. Retail investors
can face significant costs in dealing with foreign markets, notably
due to the need for different brokering arrangements for each
jurisdiction within which the investors operate.54 National
domestic rules may also impose large burdens on firms
attempting to comply with the rules of multiple regulators.55 In
addition, the same technological advances helping to drive
markets towards global reach also make fraud easier and cheaper
to perpetrate from ostensibly outside the reach of the victims’
regulators and governments.56 Finally, as more competitor
52. See John C. Coffee, Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1771
tbl. 1 (2002) (graphically showing the increase in percentage of foreign listings over
time); Tafara & Peterson, supra note 39, at 34 (noting that the New York Stock
Exchange (“NYSE”) was domestically focused historically, but now is significantly
international).
53. See Karmel, supra note 47, at 1711 (“U.S. investors are buying foreign securities
in record numbers and foreign issuers no longer believe they need to make offerings in
the U.S. to raise capital.”); Tafara & Peterson, supra note 39, at 48 (noting that “over the
past two years, U.S. retail investment abroad has surged dramatically”); see also Tahyar,
supra note 47, at 699–700 (“The current challenge for national securities regulators and
national legislators is how to reshape and modernise their national securities regulatory
systems, which were conceived at a time when markets were primarily local, to be helpful
to investors (both retail and institutional) and regulated actors already functioning on a
global level.”).
54. See Tahyar, supra note 47, at 699 (“[M]ost national systems make it burdensome
and costly for retail investors to invest in foreign securities.”); see also George W.
Madison & Stewart P. Greene, TIAA-CREF Response to a Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to
U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 99, 101–02 (2007)
(“Retail investors currently face high barriers, such as having to use foreign broker
affiliates and facing multiple layers of fees, that make direct investment abroad difficult,
although not impossible.”).
55. See Tahyar, supra note 47, at 706 (stating that barriers can exist even if legal
rules across borders are consistent); see also Walter, supra note 32, at 41 (discussing the
different approach and complicated structure of U.S. regulation).
56. See Tafara & Peterson, supra note 39, at 35 (“Technology and globalization have
also created new opportunities for securities fraud.”); see also THE INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, REPORT ON SECURITIES ACTIVITY ON THE
INTERNET III 32–33 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/
finance/securities_capital_markets/IOSCOPD159.pdf
(explaining
the
huge
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financial markets emerge and gain strength, they are at risk of
engaging in a race to the bottom—attempting to capture more
firms and capital through progressively permissive regulatory
standards.57
Alternatively, competition between different states’ financial
centers may bring some advantages to the global financial system.
The struggle for capital-raising income may lead to better
oversight coupled with lower costs through regulatory
innovation, which would be to the benefit of all market
participants.58 Additionally, firms may choose to signal their
reliability to investors by choosing a more stringent regulatory
jurisdiction.59
In this environment, states face an important choice of how
to structure their regulatory regime. The challenge for
regulators, as it has always been, is to balance compliance costs
with investor confidence.60 The regulator able to reformulate its
informational burdens investors face, even in light of vast informational access through
the internet); Schapiro Speech, supra note 45 (describing the interconnectedness of
financial markets and new challenges); Press Release, International Organization of
Securities Commissioners, IOSCO Welcomes 50th Signatory in Fight against Cross
Border Market Misconduct, IOSCO/MR/07/2009 (Mar. 31, 2009), available at
http://iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS141.pdf (“The success of the MMOU
represents a commitment by securities regulators, and their governments, to work
together to intensify investor protection and to combat the threat to market integrity
posed by the increasing occurrence of cross border market misconduct.”).
57. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at xi (“A regulatory ‘race to the bottom’ will
serve no useful competitive purpose.”); see also Tahyar, supra note 47, at 705 (“Will the
inevitable competition in a world of several financial centres create a regulatory race to
the bottom?”).
58. See Tafara & Peterson, supra note 39, at 52 (“[H]ealthy regulatory competition
exists when different regulators share the same overarching regulatory objectives, but, in
implementing comparable regimes, compete with each other to develop the most
effective and least costly ways to achieve these goals.”); see also Stravos Gadinis, The
Politics of Competition in International Financial Regulation, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 447, 492
(2008) (“The dominant center may engage in a race to the top or to the bottom against
its competitor to attract more investors from third countries.”).
59. See Bo Harvey, Exchange Consolidation and Models of International Securities
Regulation, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 151, 161 (2007) (“Having several competing
regimes can provide a useful signaling device to regulators, as companies choose to issue
securities where regulation is neither overly burdensome nor so light that investors
require a higher return on their investments to compensate them for additional risk.”);
Ariel Yehezkel, Foreign Corporations Listing in the United States: Does Law Matter? Testing the
Israeli Phenomenon, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 351, 358 (2006) (stating considerations for firms
when choosing where to list, including the signaling function to investors).
60. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at xi (explaining that a regulator must
“manag[e] regulatory costs and burdens while maintaining the confidence of
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rules to balance these factors more successfully can pull ahead of
other competitors in capturing new global capital.61 London’s
Financial Services Authority (“FSA”), discussed below, is
generally regarded as having done so.62
1. IOSCO
The International Organization for Securities Commissions
is a loose international organization consisting solely of securities
regulators.63 An individual securities regulator achieves
membership through direct application, without any necessary
intervention by other governmental organs.64 As of March 2010,
investors”); Tahyar, supra note 47, at 699 (“[T]he goals of effective regulation of
securities offerings are to balance investor protection against the benefits of capital
formation . . . .”); SEC, 2004–2009 STRATEGIC PLAN 30, available at http://www.sec.gov/
about/secstratplan0409.pdf [hereinafter SEC STRATEGIC PLAN] (“By providing a
formalized structure and government oversight, [U.S. securities] laws carefully balance
the desire for open, accessible, and competitive markets with the need to protect
investors.”).
61. See Langevoort, supra note 26, at 192 (“[R]eports have criticized U.S. securities
regulation for being unduly cumbersome, and, in part, blamed overregulation for a loss
of competitiveness . . . .”); see also INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at xi (“Investors and
companies raising capital participate in markets where they feel safe by virtue of effective
laws and rules vigorously enforced by knowledgeable, transparent courts and evenhanded, vigilant regulators.”). The internal organizational structure of regulators,
however, has not been shown to be meaningfully correlated to potential effectiveness.
See Tahyar, supra note 47, at 710–11 (“[A]cademic research to date has found little
difference in the quality of financial market oversight in jurisdictions that have
consolidated their financial regulation into unitary agencies . . . as compared to the
more traditional divisions of authority found in the United States.”); see also Martin
Cihak & Richard Podpiera, Is One Watchdog Better Than Three? International Experience
with Integrated Financial Sector Supervision 3 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 57,
2006),
available
at
http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp0657.pdf
(“[I]ntegrated supervision is generally associated with higher quality and consistency of
supervision across supervised institutions, even though a large part of the difference is
explained by other variables, mainly income level . . . .”).
62. See discussion, infra notes 90–93 (discussing the Financial Services Authority
(“FSA”)).
63. See About IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2010)
[hereinafter About IOSCO] (stating the objectives of the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”)).
64. See About IOSCO, Membership Categories and Criteria, http://iosco.org/
about/index.cfm?section=membership (last visited Aug. 21, 2010) [hereinafter IOSCO
Membership] (discussing IOSCO membership requirements); see also Pamela Jimenez,
International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act and Memoranda of Understanding, 31
HARV. INT’L L.J. 295, 306 (1990) (“[An] MOU need not be formally ratified by the
United States Senate and the corresponding body in the foreign jurisdiction . . . .”
(quoting Pitt, Hardison & Shapiro, Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational Securities
Market, 9 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 374, 435 (1987))). The SEC had been signing MOUs for
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IOSCO has 193 members, including national and provincial-level
regulators.65 IOSCO principally serves as a forum for regulators
to discuss differences and, ideally, work out cooperation
agreements.66 To this end, one of IOSCO’s primary drives has
been to engage regulators to harmonize their principles of
regulation and disclosure rules.67
IOSCO requires most participating regulators to sign the
IOSCO
Multilateral
Memorandum
of
Understanding
(“MMOU”) as a condition of joining.68 As the document itself
states, IOSCO designed the MMOU to facilitate “mutual
assistance and the exchange of information” between securities
regulators.69 The MMOU explicitly does not “create legally
binding obligations or supersede domestic laws.”70 The
provisions of the MMOU are very similar to those in the SEC’s
bilateral MOUs, some of which are over two decades old.71

years when Congress passed an act legitimizing the practice. See International Securities
Enforcement Cooperation Act (“ISECA”), title II, sec. 202, § 24, 104. Stat. 2713, 2715–16
amending 15 U.S.C. § 78x (1990); codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78x(d)(2)(B) (2007)
(legitimizing the signing of MOUs by the SEC).
65. See IOSCO Members Lists, http://iosco.org/lists/index.cfm?section=general
(last visited Aug. 21, 2010) (listing ordinary, associate and affiliate members).
66. See Tahyar, supra note 47, at 707 (“The development of IOSCO, . . . with its
intra-regulator discussions and principles, has created a forum in which securities
regulators around the world are able to work together on technical issues and agree on
principles for regulation.”); About IOSCO, supra note 63 (stating that a goal of IOSCO
is “to cooperate together to promote high standards of regulation in order to maintain
just, efficient and sound markets”).
67. See Tahyar, supra note 47, at 703 (describing “IOSCO’s work on the
harmonisation of disclosure and principles for regulators”); see also IOSCO, OBJECTIVES
AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION ii (2003), available at http://iosco.org/
library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf (“Regulation should require disclosure, as set
forth under the principles for issuers, which is necessary to evaluate the suitability of a
collective investment scheme for a particular investor and the value of the investor’s
interest in the scheme.”).
68. See IOSCO Membership, supra note 64 (“Applicants for ordinary membership
and applicants for associate membership, with primary responsibility for securities
regulation in their jurisdictions, need to apply to become signatories to the IOSCO
MOU and will need to sign the IOSCO MOU as a condition for being accepted as
IOSCO members.”).
69. Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and
Cooperation and the Exchange of Information ¶ 6(a), May 2002, available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD126.pdf [hereinafter MMOU].
70. Id.
71. Compare MMOU, supra note 69, with discussion infra Part II.B.1–3 (containing
similar provisions).
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Like MOUs, the MMOU is also considered soft law.
Standards set by IOSCO regarding the MMOU are considered
neither international nor national law.72 Though noncommittal
in nature, the agreement lays out the procedure for one partyregulator (a regulator that has signed an MOU) to make
information requests from another, as well as the actions each
should undertake to meet the requests.73
IOSCO also supports efforts by pairs of regulators to
conclude their own bilateral Memoranda of Understanding.
Typically these are supplementary to the MMOU and more
tailored to the two regulators’ specific legal needs and powers.74
Supplemental bilateral MOUs help solve one of the potential
problems with the MMOU, namely that party-regulators with
different levels of power limit its functional reach.75 For example,
party-regulators that have the domestic power to compel
testimony or disclosure can use a complementary MOU to
account for the enforcement circumstances that exist in their
respective states better than through the MMOU.76

72. See MMOU, supra note 69, ¶ 6(a) (“The provisions of this Memorandum of
Understanding are not intended to create legally binding obligations or supersede
domestic laws.”); Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in
Securities Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883, 885 (2009) (“IOSCO standards do not
have the force of either international or national law.”).
73. See MMOU, supra note 69, ¶ 6(a) (“This Memorandum of Understanding sets
forth the Authorities’ intent with regard to mutual assistance and the exchange of
information for the purpose of enforcing and securing compliance with the respective
Laws and Regulations of the jurisdictions of the Authorities.”).
74. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34
YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 144 (2009) (“IOSCO encouraged the development of a network of
bilateral MOUs between national regulators, which could better take into account
specific national laws and policies.”); IOSCO, PRINCIPLES FOR MEMORANDA OF
UNDERSTANDING
(1991),
available
at
http://iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/
ioscopd17.pdf (outlining the problems regulators face in creating MOUs).
75. See SEC, The SEC’s Cooperative Arrangements with Foreign Regulators,
http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_coopfactsheet.htm (last modified May 23, 2008)
[hereinafter Coop Factsheet] (explaining the SEC’s current policy as only signing
bilateral MOUs supplemental to the IOSCO MMOU when the other regulator has
powers beyond those enumerated in the MMOU).
76. See id.; see also Verdier, supra note 74, at 144. The MMOU has had to structure
itself to be more inclusive. See MMOU, supra note 69, ¶¶ 7(b)(iii), 9(d) (containing
provisions that are written to be inclusive).
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2. United States Competitiveness
The United States is now operating in an environment
where its financial centers must compete with global rivals in
order to attract businesses and investors. When the United States
was the only realistic option for raising capital, the expenses of
operating within the United States were perceived simply as costs
of doing business. But with the rise of competitor financial
centers, firms now have the opportunity to reduce these costs by
shopping abroad for their capital-raising needs.77 Differences in
securities laws between two states can result in significantly
different costs for a non-domestic firm picking between those
states’ financial markets.78 Reducing the impact of these
differences, or the differences themselves, can give a state a
competitive edge.79
The United States has some compensatory advantages.
Despite difficulties with competitiveness in U.S. markets, the
NYSE remains the largest capital market in the world.80 Research
interviews conducted by Professor Howell Jackson determined
that demand for the U.S. dollar as a standard unit of exchange
drives some of the capital activities of firms within the United
States, thus confirming that the U.S. dollar remains a prominent

77. See Gadinis, supra note 58, at 504 (“When a competitor challenges U.S.
dominance, however, U.S. firms and investors can no longer be indifferent to the impact
of regulation on international financial activity.”); see also Steven Davidoff, Regulating
Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. L. REV. 89, 89 (2007) (“Non-U.S. companies
increasingly appear to spurn U.S. stock markets and choose to list their securities
abroad.”).
78. See Gadinis, supra note 58, at 487 (“Foreign firms with a U.S. presence still face
increased regulatory costs due to the divergence between the U.S. regime and their local
one.”); Tahyar, supra note 47, at 706 (discussing the harmonization and recognition of
different nations’ securities laws).
79. See Gadinis, supra note 58, at 487; Tahyar, supra note 47, at 706 (“[T]here may
still be significant barriers to access to markets even if national rules are similar or even
identical.”).
80. See Davidoff, supra note 77, at 98 (“The NYSE . . . is the largest in the world.”);
see also Gadinis, supra note 58, at 493 (stating that the NYSE is “the largest stock
exchange in the world”).
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currency.81 Jackson’s interviews also concluded that the United
States continues to be considered a prestige market.82
However, U.S. markets also have hurdles to overcome. As
already suggested, regulatory standards in the United States are
higher than those required by regulators in other jurisdictions.83
U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson has highlighted the high
risk of litigation that firms seeking capital inside the United
States face, and the tort system’s high levels of inefficiency
relative to competitor jurisdictions.84 Paulson has also pointed
out the byzantine U.S. regulatory structure’s focus on to-theletter compliance with formulated rules, which robs the system of
the flexibility to deal with different firms on an individualized
basis.85 For instance, the regulations applied to each firm under
the SEC’s jurisdiction are uniform, changing only if the firm is
foreign and not a U.S. firm.86 Finally, Paulson has noted the role
new rules, especially those created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
have had in increasing compliance costs for participating firms.87
81. See Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International
Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe—Part II, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 207, 225 (2008) (“A
separate reason for accessing U.S. capital markets was the desire to obtain . . . a medium
of payment for making future acquisitions of firms located in the United States or at
least with corporations with substantial numbers of U.S. shareholders.”).
82. See id. at 224 (“The top two reasons for accessing U.S. capital markets were
financial advantages (improved pricing as a result of additional demand from U.S.
investors) and the prestige associated with entering the U.S. market.”).
83. See Sara M. Saylor, Note, Are Securities Regulators Prepared for a Truly
Transnational Exchange?, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 685, 709 (2008) (“The United States
regulators require a much higher standard of disclosure than do their European
counterparts.”); see also Henry M. Paulson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., Remarks by
Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson on the Competitiveness of United States Capital
Markets at the Economic Club of New York, Nov. 20, 2006, available at
http://ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp174.htm (“Yet recently, in the wake of new,
heightened regulatory and listing requirements for all public companies in the U.S., we
have witnessed changes in IPO activity.”).
84. See Paulson, supra note 83 (“A sophisticated legal structure . . . is necessary to
protect investors, businesses, and consumers . . . , [b]ut our legal system has gone
beyond protection.”).
85. See id. (stating that the SEC regulatory scheme is prescriptive and should be
more flexible).
86. See Daniel A. Braverman, U.S. Legal Considerations Affecting Global Offerings of
Shares in Foreign Companies, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 30, 31 (1996) (“[T]he rules
applicable to U.S. companies are also noted where they differ in substance.”); Davidoff,
supra note 77, at 151 (“The U.S. listings market is subject to one-size-fits-all regulation
which varies only if the issuer is a domestic or non-domestic one.”).
87. See Paulson, supra note 83 (explaining the effect of new rules in the context of
Sarbanes-Oxley).
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The impact of these factors shows in the numbers. In 2005,
for the first time, only six percent of capital raised globally by
firms operating outside their home jurisdiction was raised in the
United States.88 In the same year, only one of the top twenty-five
initial public offerings was offered within the Unites States.89
3. London’s Financial Services Administration
The FSA in the United Kingdom provides a useful example
of a new approach to regulatory objectives and the kind of
competition the United States is facing. In stark contrast to
Secretary Paulson’s statements about the U.S. regulatory regime,
the Director of Enforcement at the FSA has characterized the
FSA as “innovative and highly effective.”90 The FSA’s
philosophical regulatory approach acknowledges that failures are
impossible to eliminate, and thus the agency focuses on “bigticket” dangers.91 The FSA avoids imposing new rules until after
an attempt to solve the problem through the market.92
88. Davidoff, supra note 77, at 112 (“For example, in 2005, 352 companies issued
equity outside their home markets for the first time, raising a total of $92 billion. Only
six percent of this equity, or $4.6 billion, was raised on the U.S. public markets.”); see
also INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at 29 (“[I]n 2005, approximately one in every 20
[IPO] dollars was raised in the United States.”). One criticism is that U.S. regulation is a
one-size-fits-all approach. See Davidoff, supra note 77, at 151 (“The U.S. listings market is
subject to one-size-fits-all regulation which varies only if the issuer is a domestic or nondomestic one.”); Paulson, supra note 83.
89. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at 30 (“Twenty-four of twenty-five of the
largest IPOs in 2005 and nine of the ten largest IPOs in 2006 to date took place outside
the United States.”); see also Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for
Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1435, 1435 (2008) (“Instead, foreign exchanges have
developed liquid markets of their own, and now consistently attract over 90 percent of
the world’s initial public offerings (IPOs) and half of all investor activity.”).
90. Margaret Cole, Dir. of Enforcement, Fin. Serv. Auth. [FSA], The U.K. FSA:
Nobody Does it Better?, Lecture at the A.A. Sommer Jr. Lecture on Corporate,
Securities, & Financial Law, in 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 259, 267 (2007) (“But I
would still argue that our model in the United Kingdom is an innovative and highly
effective one.”). See generally Iain MacNeil, The Future for Financial Regulation: The
Financial Services and Markets Bill, 62 MOD. L. REV. 725 (1999) (reviewing the structure
and purpose of the FSA).
91. See Cole, supra note 90, at 269 (discussing the “non-zero-failure regime”); THE
TREASURY COMM., FSA, RECENT TURBULENCE IN GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS AND
NORTHERN ROCK’S LIQUIDITY CRISIS (2007), ¶ 6, available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/
pubs/other/tsc.pdf (“In competitive markets there will be failures; as we have said in the
past, it would be impossible—and, in any event, undesirable to seek to eliminate all risk
from financial markets and to operate a zero-failure regime.”).
92. See Cole, supra note 90, at 269 (“Our philosophy is that only after market
solutions have been exhausted should regulatory initiatives be contemplated.”); FSA, A
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Outcomes, rather than process, are the priority for the FSA,
giving it the flexibility the SEC is struggling to achieve.93 By
structuring normative guidelines, the FSA is able to tailor its
approach to specific situations, while the SEC proscribes rules
that mandate compliance even if the particular needs of a
transaction or situation may be less than those required.94
4. SEC Rules
Many SEC rules are relevant to U.S. and foreign firms
seeking to utilize U.S. financial markets. SEC Rule 144A and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in particular, have created very important
considerations for foreign firms seeking to raise capital within
the United States. Each requirement has significantly altered how
foreign companies view the capital-raising potential of the U.S.
market and their deliberations about whether to enter it.
Promulgated in order to reduce the barriers to foreign firms
seeking to raise capital in the United States,95 Rule 144A permits
foreign issuers to sidestep SEC registration requirements by
limiting the sale of their offering to institutional, and thus
presumably sophisticated, buyers.96 The securities offered,
however, must not be the same as the issuer’s other publicly held
securities.97 Rule 144A offerings are now non-U.S. firms’

GUIDE TO MARKET FAILURE ANALYSIS AND HIGH LEVEL COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/mfa_guide.pdf (discussing the
importance of market failure in the FSA’s regulatory outlook).
93. See Cole, supra note 90, at 270 (“[T]he FSA is an advocate for principles-based
regulation . . . [with a] focus . . . on the outcomes rather than on the prescription of
detailed rules.”); Paulson, supra note 83; see also Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Sarbanes-Oxley Five
Years Later: A Canadian Perspective, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 469, 469 (2008) (“[T]he UK
approach places emphasis on normative guidelines rather than detailed rules.”).
94. See Cole, supra note 90, at 270; Paulson, supra note 83; see also Ben-Ishai, supra
note 93, at 469.
95. See Private Resales of Securities to Institutions, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2009)
(listing the requirements for a 144A listing); Jackson & Pan, supra note 81, at 246
(“[W]hen the SEC adopted Rule 144A in April 1990, the Commission intended to make
it easier for foreign issuers to enter the U.S. markets.”).
96. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (requiring that the securities be “offered or sold only
to a qualified institutional buyer or to an offeree or purchaser that the seller and any
person acting on behalf of the seller reasonably believe is a qualified institutional
buyer.”); Jackson & Pan, supra note 81, at 212 n.4 (“Rule 144A offers publicly-traded
foreign issuers greater leeway in raising equity from large institutional investors located
in the United States than is available to publicly traded U.S. domestic issuers.”).
97. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (listing the qualifications for exemption).
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preferred method of raising capital in the United States.98 The
potential effect of excluding retail investors from these offerings
is in large part reduced because demand for foreign securities
comes mainly from institutional investors—no doubt partially a
result of the high costs individual retail investors face in such
transactions.99
Despite its liberal treatment of non-U.S. issuers, Rule 144A
does not exempt issuers utilizing the rule from all other SEC
requirements.100 Firms taking advantage of Rule 144A remain
within the umbrella of the SEC’s enforcement provisions for
proscribed conduct regarding investors.101 In particular, firms
remain subject to the SEC’s antifraud provisions.102 One such
important rule, Rule 10b-5, is a wide-reaching antifraud
regulation that prohibits using any “means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, . . . mails or . . . any facility of any national
securities exchange[]” to commit fraud or release false material
facts.103
Conscientious firms can entirely avoid interference from the
SEC. Regulation S specifies that a foreign firm is not subject to
the U.S. Securities Act of 1933104 when the firm’s offering is made
outside the United States and is not directed at U.S. citizens,
provided that such securities are not resold to U.S. citizens for a

98. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at 46 (stating that in 2005, over ninety
percent of all foreign initial public offering capital raised in the U.S. was through Rule
144A exemptions); see also Jackson & Pan, supra note 81, at 244 (showing in Table 3 the
growing importance of Rule 144A offerings).
99. See Jackson & Pan, supra note 81, at 232 (“[T]he demand for foreign shares in
the United States was predominantly from institutional investors, whether sold in public
offerings or in Rule 144A transactions.”); see also Tahyar, supra note 47, at 699 (stating
that “most national systems make it burdensome and costly for retail investors to invest
in foreign securities”).
100. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (“This section relates solely to the application of
section 5 of the Act and not to antifraud or other provisions of the federal securities
laws.”).
101. See Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2009) (making it unlawful for any person to use an instrument of interstate commerce
for fraud in a securities transaction); 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A.
102. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A.
103. Id. § 240.10b-5.
104. See Gary M. Brown, Securities Act Registration Exemptions, 1756 PLI/CORP. 209,
240 (2009) (discussing Regulation S as a safe harbor provision); Harvey, supra note 59,
at 159 (discussing Regulation S as a safe harbor provision).
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year.105 Transactions meeting these requirements are functionally
exempt from the SEC’s registration requirements.106 Firms falling
under this regulation avoid both the risk of litigation in the
United States and the substantial costs of registering securities
with the SEC.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act107 was passed in 2002 in response to
the corporate scandals surrounding Enron, Worldcom, and
Arthur Andersen.108 The Act contains broad provisions requiring
non-U.S. firms to comply with its measures.109 For example,
section 106 requires that non-U.S. accounting firms, if they
undertake the corporate governance work specified in the Act,
must comply with the same standards as U.S. accounting firms.110

105. See Brown, supra note 104, at 240 (“The regulation is complex, but one of its
main features is that in the kind of transaction described, the securities may not be
reoffered or resold to U.S. persons for one year.”); Harvey, supra note 59, at 159
(“Regulation S provides safe harbors for issuers in response to the question of whether it
is appropriate to require an issuer to register its securities under the Securities Act of
1933—even though there would be jurisdiction to do so—when it offers those securities
exclusively to non-U.S. citizens in offshore transactions.”).
106. See Rules Governing Offers and Sales Made Outside the United States Without
Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.901-05 (2007) (detailing
the Regulation S exemption); see also Brown, supra note 104, at 240 (“[Regulation S] is
an interpretive regulation by which one can determine if a particular offshore
transaction is subject to the Securities Act.”); Harvey, supra note 59, at 159 (“Regulation
S provides safe harbors for issuers when it offers those securities exclusively to non-U.S.
citizens in offshore transactions.”). In the case of non-U.S. firms offering securities to
non-U.S. citizens outside of the United States, it is difficult to see how the United States
could obtain jurisdiction anyway. See infra notes 152–184 and accompanying text
(discussing U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction).
107. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 17 U.S.C. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
108. See Saylor, supra note 83, at 707 (“In the wake of corporate scandals of the
1990s, the U.S. Congress amended the laws governing corporate governance and
disclosure . . . by regulated companies to increase investor confidence.”); see also
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance,
114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1591 (2005) (pointing out that Sarbanes-Oxley is a prime example of
poor legislative product that comes out of rushed Congressional action responding to
emergency situations).
109. See Ben-Ishai, supra note 93, at 471 (“SOX [Sarbanes-Oxley Act] has an
extraterritorial application in that it applies to all publicly traded companies on U.S.
stock exchanges, notwithstanding their status as cross-listed foreign issuers.”); Saylor,
supra note 83, at 708 (“Sarbanes-Oxley, enacted hastily in response to financial scandals,
includes sections which apply to foreign issuers without consideration as to whether it
was appropriate to do so.”).
110. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 17 U.S.C. Pub. L. No. 107-204, at § 106(a)(1),
116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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Of all the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, however, section 404
is among the most notorious.111 The section requires the
corporate management of a securities-issuing firm to attest to the
effectiveness of its internal requirements for financial
reporting.112 Section 404 further requires that an independent
auditor, in the form of a registered public accounting firm,
report on the statements made by the corporate management.113
The benefits of section 404 include the reduction of
information costs for investors and increased efficiency within
companies’ internal reporting systems.114 But although it has had
benefits, in the final calculation, section 404 has been
detrimental to U.S. competitiveness. It has drastically increased
compliance costs for foreign firms.115 Average per-firm costs of
compliance ended up thirty-five times higher than initial
estimates.116 The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation,
111. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at 115 (“The main policy debate over
SOX, however, is focused on the implementation of a single provision, Section
404 . . . .”); see also Ben-Ishai, supra note 93, at 483–84 (“The current focus on amending
or rolling back SOX is centered upon section 404, which deals with internal controls.”).
112. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 17 U.S.C. Pub. L. No. 107-204, at § 404(a), 116
Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (listing internal assessment
controls in SOX).
113. See id. § 404(b) (“With respect to the internal control assessment required by
subsection (a), each registered public accounting firm that prepares or issues the audit
report for the issuer shall attest to, and report on, the assessment made by the
management of the issuer. An attestation made under this subsection shall be made in
accordance with standards for attestation engagements issued or adopted by the Board.
Any such attestation shall not be the subject of a separate engagement.”).
114. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at 119 (“Section 404 control reviews
appear to have acted as a catalyst for companies to improve the efficiency of financial
management”); see also Ben-Ishai, supra note 93, at 478 (explaining the benefits of SOX
as being “more efficient financial reporting processes and improved management
understanding of corporate risks”).
115. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at 115 (“There is widespread concern that
the compliance costs of Section 404 [of SOX] are excessive.”); see also Davidoff, supra
note 77, at 132 (“[T]he increased level of regulation imposed on non-U.S. issuers by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been qualitatively significant.”); Ben-Ishai, supra note 93, at 471
(stating that Sarbanes-Oxley is seen “as imposing higher costs than benefits”). Other
jurisdictions considered implementing reforms similar to Sarbanes-Oxley, but ultimately
rejected the idea. See Ben-Ishai, supra note 93, at 480 (“Multilateral Instrument 52-111,
the Canadian equivalent of section 404 of SOX, was not implemented . . . .”); Saylor,
supra note 83, at 709 (“Nevertheless, Sarbanes-Oxley and similar European regulations
are not quite the same. The United States regulators require a much higher standard of
disclosure than do their European counterparts.”).
116. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at 126 (showing that the SEC’s initial
estimate was thirty-five times lower than the actual cost of compliance); Cost Estimates of
Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance on the Rise, http://my.advisor.com/doc/14592 (last visited

1822 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1800
designed to explore methods of improving U.S. financial
markets’ competitiveness, has concluded that a more efficient
implementation of section 404 is necessary—in particular one
which does not subject foreign firms to duplicate regulation
when they already face requirements similar to section 404 in
their home states.117
Despite the problems within its financial markets, the
United States remains a significant and important actor in
international finance. If the United States can make itself more
attractive compared to its competitor jurisdictions, the trend
towards investing through U.S. competitors may be slowed, or
even reversed. This can be achieved by reducing the barriers
firms and investors face when operating within the United States,
including lessening the impact of regulatory differences and
expanding effective enforcement transnationally.
C. Feasibility of International Cooperation
The field of securities regulation presents serious issues
regarding international cooperation. Specific shared norms are
infrequent in securities regulation, but securities enforcement
seems to be an area ripe for coordination.118 The structure of the
markets in question—here international financial markets—
changes the likelihood and effectiveness of attempts to
coordinate between states. IOSCO is not the only organization
active in this field; in 2004 the Organization for Economic
Development put together standards for corporate governance,
including disclosure.119

Aug. 21, 2010) (“The cost estimates of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 compliance rose 62
percent in six months . . . .”).
117. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 32, at 131, 133 (“The Committee would not
apply Section 404 to foreign firms that could demonstrate that they were subject to
equivalent home country internal control regulation.”).
118. See Hannah L Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L.
251, 264 (2006) (“[T]here are fewer shared norms in the area of securities
regulation.”); Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 462 (2006) (“[T]he rapid integration of
financial markets suggests the utility of harmonizing securities regulation and
corporation law.”).
119. See Buxbaum, supra note 118, at 264 (discussing international accounting
principles); see also OECD, OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 9 (2004),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf (2004) (discussing the
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1. Market Structures
The way a particular market is structured changes the
arrangement of the incentives of its participants and affects the
prospects for meaningful cooperation within it. Stravos Gadinis, a
post-graduate fellow at Harvard Law School specializing in
international finance and securities regulation, has outlined four
types of international market structures and what they imply for
the likelihood of cooperation: (1) a centralized market under
strong dominance; (2) a dispersed market under strong
dominance; (3) a centralized market with contested dominance;
and (4) a dispersed market with contested dominance.120 As
transnational finance moves away from a U.S.-dominated and
centered model into a more pluralistic structure, where the
global market ultimately ends up is relevant to the prospects and
structure of any potential cooperative scheme. The first and third
market models are relevant to the changes currently taking place
in international finance.
A centralized market under strong dominance, the first
model, is akin to a system where only one exchange of
meaningful size exists globally.121 Such a dominant center is not
motivated to respond to the desires of foreign entities.122 In a
strongly dominated and centralized market, foreign governments
expect to structure their own rules to make it easier for their
firms to operate with the dominant center.123 Thus, the standards
of non-dominant states tend to converge on the standards of the
dominant center.124 The past U.S. dominance in the global
financial market post-World War II is a model example of such a
centralized market with strong dominance.125
promulgation of the OECD corporate governance standards); Robbins, supra note 118,
at 463 (discussing the OECD principles of corporate governance).
120. See Gadinis, supra note 58, at 451–52 (explaining the meaning of different
dimensions of market structures).
121. See id. at 470–73 (discussing centralized markets under strong dominance
generally).
122. See id. at 473 (discussing the unlikelihood of success of foreign firms lobbying
the dominant center).
123. See id. at 474 (“Local governments that wish to minimize compliance costs for
their constituents are more likely to accept ‘coordination’ with a set of rules very close, if
not identical, to the dominant center’s regime.”).
124. See id.
125. See id. at 475 (“Up to the early 2000s, U.S. dominance in the primary securities
markets was strong. Foreign companies gravitated toward U.S. markets to take advantage
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A more recent example from a related field illustrates how
the theory of converging standards plays out in practice.
European states attempted to force the United States to allow
more Europe-friendly accounting standards to be applied to
foreign companies seeking to raise capital in the United States.126
However, the United States refused to acquiesce and the
international accounting standards ended up close to existing
U.S. standards, thus demonstrating that the U.S. retains some
muscle in international finance.127
In a centralized market with contested dominance, the third
model, competitors rise to challenge an old hegemon, forcing
investors and firms to choose between established financial
centers.128 In situations like these, there is a danger of a race to
the bottom—that competing financial centers could attempt to
attract more investors and capital through progressively
permissive regulation.129 Alternatively, the competing centers
could respond with a race to the top to capture more of the
global financial market through more innovative regulation—
regulation that is more effective while lowering costs.130
Ultimately, cooperation is unlikely as governments seek to
protect their own center from competition and retain their
domestic market by making regulations incompatible with their
competitors’ regulations.131 Governments are more likely to bow
to pressure from powerful domestic groups controlling the
domestic centers than to the needs of foreign entities.132 As more
of their deeper liquidity and lower cost of capital, often combining a public offering
with a listing on a U.S. stock exchange.”).
126. See id. at 479 (“The European Commission hoped that under the political
weight of twenty-five jurisdictions, the IASB would be able to push for accounting
solutions preferable to European companies otherwise disadvantaged by U.S. GAAP.”).
127. See id. (“In the end, the United States did not yield in its insistence that the
differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS be reduced to a minimum (i.e., that IFRS
obtain virtually the same content as U.S. GAAP) before the reconciliation requirement
could be dropped.”).
128. See id. at 490 (“In centralized markets, competition between the dominant
center and a new venue leads to increased polarization.”).
129. See id. at 492 (“The dominant center may engage in a race to the top or to the
bottom against its competitor to attract more investors from third countries.”).
130. See id.
131. See id. (“Eventually, the dominant center’s government will maintain
regulatory barriers that increase the costs investors from the dominant center face when
seeking to access the competitor’s market.”).
132. See id. (“Thus, the groups opposing coordination and seeking protection from
the dominant center’s government are likely to have greater domestic influence; these
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financial centers arise and develop to compete with the United
States, global capital markets correspond more and more closely
to this model.133
These different types of markets warrant different
approaches to international cooperation. It appears that the
international financial system is drifting from a centralized
market with uncontested dominance to one with contested
dominance—financial centers are clearly defined and competing
with each other to capture new investment. As the uncontested
dominance of the United States fades, governments and
regulators operating within this environment have to overcome
increasing incentives to not cooperate. In the particular case of
financial centers within a state, pressure for more stringent and
internationally incompatible regulation may come from retail
investor voters—particularly salient in the United States—rather
than the finance industry itself, since their income is dependent
on attracting investors and firms seeking to raise capital.
Regulators seeking to cooperate across national borders need to
balance these two forces.
2. Other Considerations
Cooperation can be affected by a wide range of other
factors. The perception of the motivations behind attempts to
coordinate can make actors balk at participation. Differing
norms between jurisdictions and domestic pressures may also
either inhibit or promote cooperation.
International sensitivity about the real motivations behind
coordination can hinder its prospects. The proliferation of a
regulatory standard may be an expression of a state’s hegemony,
or at least be perceived as such, and make other states uneasy
about participating.134 This apprehension is born out of concern
entities are typically cohesive and well-resourced interest groups perceived as central to
the local economy.”).
133. See id. at 494 (“Although capitalization data confirm the preeminence of U.S.
markets in terms of size, developments in foreign stock exchanges during the 1990s have
allowed them to contest the dominance of U.S. market operators.”); see also supra notes
77–89 and accompanying text (discussing American competitiveness).
134. See Buxbaum, supra note 118, at 303–04 (“[C]oncerns of observers . . . do
speak to continued reservations regarding the appropriateness of applying international
regulatory norms in domestic courts—particularly . . . if both the source of the norms
and their enforcement are centralized in one country.”); Verdier, supra note 74, at 150
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that one state’s norms will be imposed on other states through
the creation of international law in a dominated forum.135 For
example, one of IOSCO’s successes has been the development of
a standard for disclosure in international offerings.136 However,
this standard is very similar to the SEC’s pre-existing
requirements.137 Such similarities are taken to demonstrate U.S.
influence in the global capital market, rather than a genuine
international consensus on disclosure.138
Irreconcilably different norms can also sink attempts at
cooperation.139 For example, IOSCO’s successes have come in
areas, such as fraud prevention, where the domestic preferences
of the involved states are closely aligned.140 In other areas, such as
(“The form was in fact virtually identical to the SEC’s existing form for private foreign
issuers, and its adoption reflected little more than an exercise of U.S. market power in
setting global disclosure standards.”).
135. See Buxbaum, supra note 118, at 303–04 (discussing the appropriateness of
applying one state’s norms to another state through the creation of international law);
Verdier, supra note 74, at 150 (“[The disclosure form’s] adoption reflected little more
than an exercise of U.S. market power in setting global disclosure standards.”).
136. See Robbins, supra note 118, at 462 (stating that “[o]ne of the IOSCO’s key
projects has been the formation of a core set of disclosure standards for nonfinancial
statement portions of a proposed international offering document,” which the SEC
adopted); Verdier, supra note 74, at 150 (“In 1998, IOSCO adopted a standardized form
intended to be used by its members as a uniform standard for nonfinancial disclosure by
foreign firms raising capital in their jurisdiction.”). See generally ISOSCO,
INTERNATIONAL DISCLOSURE STANDARDS FOR CROSS-BORDER OFFERINGS AND INITIAL
LISTINGS BY FOREIGN ISSUERS (1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/
oia_corpfin/crossborder.pdf (containing IOSCO’s disclosure standards).
137. See Verdier, supra note 74, at 150 (“The [IOSCO disclosure] form was in fact
virtually identical to the SEC’s existing form for private foreign issuers . . . .”); see also J.
William Hicks, Harmonization of Disclosure Standards for Cross-Border Share Offerings:
Approaching an “International Passport” to Capital Markets?, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
361, 372 n.27 (2002) (stating that “the SEC was a major participant” in IOSCO efforts to
put out the disclosure standards, thus influencing outcome).
138. See Verdier, supra note 74, at 150 (stating that “[the disclosure form’s]
adoption reflected little more than an exercise of U.S. market power in setting global
disclosure standards”); see also Hicks, supra note 136, at 372 n.27 (stating that “the SEC
was a major participant” in IOSCO efforts to put out the disclosure standards, thus
influencing the outcome).
139. See Buxbaum, supra note 118, at 295 (explaining the discrepancy between
domestic norms and the effect on cooperative prospects, including over whether
“private lawsuits may be inappropriate means to pursue public regulatory goals”);
Verdier, supra note 74, at 126 (“If the participants in TRNs were free to disregard
domestic preferences in their states and pursue globally optimal policies, distributive
and enforcement problems would not hinder international regulatory cooperation.”).
140. See Verdier, supra note 74, at 143 (“IOSCO has been largely successful at
coordinating securities enforcement among developed countries because they share
strong domestic preferences in preventing transnational securities fraud.”); Thomas D.
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dealing with offshore financial havens, IOSCO has met serious
difficulties in convincing such states to give up lucrative
practices.141 In general, large developed states have been more
ready participants in cooperative schemes, to a significant extent
because capital markets comprise such large and advanced parts
of their economies.142
The domestic forces acting on securities regulators are also
important in shaping their outlook and actions. Even as markets
become ever more international, drawing investors from around
the world, securities regulators remain domestic entities limited
by statutory mandates.143 This link to the legislative process and
the constituent pressures acting on legislators can undermine
attempts by regulators to exercise independence through
unilateral regulatory reform.144 Concerns about the ability of
partner regulators to resist political pressure to deviate from
informally agreed upon standards make even strongly
independent regulators hesitant to enter into such agreements
with weaker counterparts.145
Willett, National Macroeconomic Policy Preferences and International Coordination Issues, 8 J.
PUB. POLICY 235, 235 (1988) (“It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that domestic
political pressures frequently have a major impact on national macroeconomic policy
making.”).
141. See Verdier, supra note 74, at 143 (“IOSCO faced considerable resistance in its
efforts to secure enforcement cooperation from offshore financial centers (“OFC”s),
which have strong domestic incentives to protect their financial industry through strict
privacy laws and lax securities fraud enforcement.”); Willett, supra note 140, at 235.
142. See Verdier, supra note 74, at 146 (stating that “[IOSCO’s] success can be
accounted for by these states’ parallel domestic preferences for effective securities
enforcement[,]” especially when both markets are highly developed); Willett, supra note
140, at 235.
143. See Davidoff, supra note 77, at 124 (“[T]he interests of securities regulators
still tend to be local.”); see also Verdier, supra note 74, at 126 (“[Regulators] are instead
politically and legally accountable to numerous domestic constituencies, including not
only their superiors in the executive branch but also the legislature, the courts, the
media, and the public.”).
144. See David A. Singer, Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of International Regulatory
Harmonization, 58 INT’L ORG. 531, 532–35, 537–44 (2004) (discussing the “win-set” for
regulators as a range of action that will satisfy a range of both competitiveness and
confidence in the market acceptable to legislators without them intervening); see also
Verdier, supra note 74, at 127 (“[P]oliticians exercise significant influence over the
administrative process.”).
145. See Singer, supra note 144, at 532–35, 537–44 (talking about a restricted “winset” for regulators as a range of agreement that will be acceptable enough to legislators
to prevent them from intervening, which could negate commitments made unilaterally
by the regulator); Verdier, supra note 74, at 127 (“Even a powerful and independent
regulator like the Federal Reserve might hesitate to commit itself to a demanding
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Attempting to reconcile different norms among
international actors raises the costs of international coordination.
Domestic constraints on actors and suspicion of the motivations
behind international efforts may scuttle attempts to cooperate.
MOUs sidestep many of these problems by being very narrow—
really only a framework for cooperation—and by being
nonenforceable, thus encouraging otherwise hesitant regulators
to sign by minimizing the potential effect of their provisions.
Even when parties have entered into an MOU in part because it
is unenforceable, the existence of the agreement facilitates more
cooperation than would otherwise occur, creating a surprisingly
effective arrangement between diverse regulators.
3. A European Union Development
The EU has undertaken an ambitious project to substantially
harmonize aspects of the securities laws of its Member States. The
Financial Services Action Plan presented uniform rules to
accelerate the integration of financial markets across the EU.146
In particular, FSAP’s established standard disclosure
requirements allow securities that pass muster in one EU
jurisdiction to travel freely within the EU.147
However, the plan is not completely comprehensive. FSAP
allows individual states to determine which rules to apply when
the securities in question are not publicly offered, or are below a

international standard if it suspected that some of its foreign counterparts would be
unable to resist domestic political pressures to breach that standard.”).
146. See FSAP, supra note 34 (discussing the European move to a single market and
FSAP’s goals within that framework); Council Directive No. 2003/71, art. 1, 2003 O.J. L
345/64, at 68 [hereinafter Prospectus Directive] (“The purpose of this Directive is to
harmonise requirements for the drawing up, approval and distribution of the prospectus
to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a
regulated market situated or operating within a Member State.”); see also Enriques &
Gatti, supra note 34, at 43 (“The main purpose of the FSAP was to provide the legal
bedrock for EU financial markets’ integration through uniform rules that, while
providing a high level of investor protection, at the same time lower the costs that
otherwise stem from the joint application of differing Member States’ legal regimes to
cross-border transactions.”).
147. See FSAP, supra note 34, at 12 (discussing the European move to a single
market and FSAP’s goals within that framework); Enriques & Gatti, supra note 34, at 54
(“The Directive gives issuers a ‘passport’ to allow them to raise capital within the
European borders on the basis of a single prospectus in order to reduce EU issuers’
overall transaction costs.”).
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certain aggregate value threshold.148 Finally, national regulators
are left with the ultimate regulatory power over securities
emanating from their jurisdictions, regardless of where they
travel under FSAP’s umbrella.149 This arrangement, as a concept,
is beyond the role of an MOU, but serves as a useful example of
successful—and
binding—coordination
in
transnational
securities markets.150
Developments in international finance have been rapid and
will likely continue in direction, if not in strength. The SEC and
other regulators have acknowledged the importance of this
growing field and regulatory innovation within it.151 These
important changes require a new, more cooperative approach to
international securities regulation. Although the U.S. global
market share has declined, the United States retains the political
and economic muscle to take the lead in the global discussion
about international securities regulation cooperation. Regulatory
changes within the United States and other pressures, including
IOSCO’s cooperative efforts, may yet negate some aspects
contributing to the trends reducing U.S. influence and
attractiveness. Understanding market structures, as well as other
pressures and considerations acting on regulators and
governments,
contributes
to
structuring
international
cooperation in a way most likely to be successful. MOUs respond
to these issues and are structured to succeed within their
environment.

148. See Prospectus Directive, supra note 146, No. 2003/71, art. 1, 2003 O.J. L
345/64, at 68 (“Notwithstanding paragraph 2(b), (d), (h), (i) and (j), an issuer, an
offeror or a person asking for admission to trading on a regulated market shall be
entitled to draw up a prospectus in accordance with this Directive when securities are
offered to the public or admitted to trading.”); see also Enriques & Gatti, supra note 34,
at 56 (“[L]ocal legislatures appear to be able to apply the harmonized regime or even
their own idiosyncratic national provisions also to transactions that, as a matter of EC
law, do not constitute a public offer.”).
149. See Prospectus Directive, supra note 146, No. 2003/71, art. 13, 2003 O.J. L
345/64, at 76 (stating that prospectuses must be approved by home state regulator
before they can disseminate to the market); see also Enriques & Gatti, supra note 34, at 58
(stating that the home regulator has jurisdiction regardless of where the securities it
approved are traded within the EU).
150. See supra notes 146–149 and accompanying text (discussing the scope and
measures of FSAP, including disclosure standards).
151. See supra note 45 (discussing SEC changes).
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II. INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE MOU
FRAMEWORK
The SEC has been able to take advantage of U.S. courts’
eagerness to exert extraterritorial jurisdiction in prosecuting
financial misconduct abroad. However, foreign secrecy laws
continue to be a difficult hurdle for parties and courts seeking or
compelling disclosure from non-U.S. jurisdictions. The MOU
helps overcome these challenges and targets others, including
the development of effective capital markets and regulation
within other states. Access to information by the SEC seems to
have greatly increased as a result of its MOU agreements with
foreign regulators. As a soft-law mechanism, the MOU is not
binding, but is instead structured in such a way as to acknowledge
and accommodate potential conflicts between regulators. In this
capacity, it is a framework for information-exchange cooperation
and creates expected methods of interaction and communication
between regulators.
In order to further the understanding of MOUs as a
cooperative framework, Part II.A examines the state of U.S.
extraterritorial jurisdiction and disclosure jurisprudence. Part
II.B studies the actual form of the MOU, in its enforcement
cooperation, regulatory cooperation, and technical assistance
forms. That information is then applied to a simple economicpolitical game in Part II.C to extract its potential usefulness as a
procedural structure. Part II.D briefly discusses some other states
that have signed MOUs. Lastly, Part II.E looks at U.S. statutes
related to MOUs and their confidentiality provisions.
A. Reaching Out: Extraterritorial Judicial Considerations
The SEC has expressed its own mission as: (1) protecting
investors; (2) maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets;
and (3) facilitating capital formation.152 In carrying out this
mandate, however, the SEC has increasingly faced conduct that
Extraterritorial
jurisdiction
and
occurs
overseas.153

152. See SEC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 60, at 4 (detailing the mission of the
SEC).
153. See supra notes 77–89 and accompanying text (discussing American
competitiveness and changes in global investment markets that expose U.S. entities to
more transnational investment).
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extraterritorial disclosure are two tools U.S. courts have utilized
to deal with foreign defendants.
U.S. jurisdiction theory is fundamentally based on
territoriality—the idea that a state has authority only over that
which occurs within its own borders.154 Comity, a connected
concept, holds that a state should not interfere with the actions
of another state.155 These notions, however, have proven
somewhat incompatible when dealing with the new kinds of
transnational issues facing the SEC and other enforcement
bodies.156
1. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in a Securities Context
When the SEC brings securities violation actions against
foreign defendants, it must meet U.S. courts’ jurisdictional
standards—the defendant’s conduct must have been subject to
U.S. law. Courts in the United States only apply U.S. laws outside
of U.S. borders when Congress has intended to provide for
extraterritorial jurisdiction.157 Congressional legislative history is
154. See Buxbaum, supra note 118, at 280–82 (“[B]ecause [jurisdiction] remains
rooted in notions of territorial sovereignty, it is simply not well suited to cases that
involve forms of global harm in which both the conduct and its effects are felt
simultaneously in many jurisdictions—harm that, in a sense, does not merely cross
borders but transcends them.”); see also Caryn R. Nutt, Carnero v. Boston Scientific
Corporation: Interpreting the Extraterritorial Effect of the Civil Whistleblower Protection Provision
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 201, 208 (2006) (discussing the territoriality
presumption).
155. See Nutt, supra note 154, at 208–09 (explaining the connection between
territoriality and “‘the principle of international comity, under which the United States
should avoid interference with the laws of another sovereign over conduct occurring
within its territory.’”) (quoting Denty v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 907 F. Supp. 879,
882 (E.D. Pa. 1995)); see also Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality, and the
Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflicts, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 631, 648–49 (2009) (discussing the
connection between territoriality and comity).
156. See Buxbaum, supra note 118, at 281–82 (“In the securities context too, the
jurisdictional analysis based on territorial links respects the sovereignty of other
countries, but fails to account for the fairly global arguments made in favor of United
States jurisdiction.”); Nutt, supra note 154, at 207–08, 214–15 (discussing territoriality
presumption and the difficulty in expanding jurisdiction to include “extraterritorial”
jurisdictions).
157. See Nutt, supra note 154, at 209 (“[T]he territoriality presumption typically
operates to limit the reach of legislation to application only within the territorial
boundaries of the United States unless Congress has expressly conferred extraterritorial
authority”); Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1310, 1314 (1985) (“The language and legislative history of
the securities acts are rather unclear with respect to extraterritoriality. In light of this
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useful in determining congressional intent, but such legislative
history must be tempered with the knowledge that Congress is
aware that it must make a statement of clear intent within a given
statute. Therefore, the absence of clearly stated intent can itself
be evidence of intent to limit jurisdiction.158
In practice, however, U.S. courts have often found such
intent and viewed their own jurisdiction broadly.159 Regarding
securities, courts have inferred a congressional intent for
extraterritorial application regardless of the lack of express
statements by Congress, in large part because Congress did not
anticipate the rise in importance of transnational securities
transactions.160
Courts have justified jurisdiction in securities cases under a
variety of reasons. At a seeming extreme, the Eighth Circuit has
gone so far as to claim jurisdiction where the matter was brought
by a foreign plaintiff; involved securities issued by a foreign firm
and not available within the United States; lacked any domestic
effect; and was born out of conduct taken, in most part, outside

ambiguous jurisdictional mandate, courts have stretched the statutory language,
divining an unexpressed congressional intent.”).
158. See Nutt, supra note 154, at 213, 219 (stating that “the legislative history of the
congressional action is a key part of this inquiry” and that “Congress is aware of the
need to make a clear statement that it intends legislative action to apply
extraterritorially”); Note, supra note 157, at 1314 (“The language and legislative history
of the securities acts are rather unclear with respect to extraterritoriality. In light of this
ambiguous jurisdictional mandate, courts have stretched the statutory language,
divining an unexpressed congressional intent.”).
159. See Jill E. Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering United States Regulation of Foreign
Tender Offers, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 523, 523 (1993) (“Traditionally the United States has
viewed its jurisdiction expansively and imposed its regulations on transactions that may
be viewed as essentially foreign.”); see also Plessey Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 628 F.Supp. 477,
494 (D. Del. 1986) (“To prevent the United States from becoming a ‘Barbary Coast’
hospitable to international securities ‘pirates’ who defraud investors, the exercise of
jurisdiction by American courts must be broad.” (citing SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116
(3d Cir. 1977)).
160. See Fisch, supra note 159, at 548 (“The courts have responded that Congress
could not have been expected, when the Exchange Act was drafted, to foresee the
development of an international and largely interdependent market for securities.”); see
also Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975) (“The Congress
that passed these extraordinary pieces of legislation in the midst of the depression could
hardly have been expected to foresee the development of off-shore funds thirty years
later.”).
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the United States.161 In general, though, U.S. courts have typically
accepted jurisdiction partially to deter foreign entities from
engaging in misconduct by providing a forum for foreign
plaintiffs to redress their injuries.162 This interest becomes more
relevant as the effects of financial misconduct are increasingly
border-blind and the opportunities for transnational misconduct
become more common.163
There are three basic conditions that may trigger
jurisdiction by U.S. courts. An explanatory case, Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., involved a foreign offering where investors had
been given false and misleading information about the prospects
and activities of the issuing company.164 In Bersch, the Second
Circuit articulated the three circumstances under which federal
securities laws apply: (1) when “Americans resident in the United
States” are injured; (2) when U.S. citizens abroad have been
injured and material acts occurred within the United States; and
(3) when acts that occurred within the United States directly
caused the injury to foreigners not resident in the United
States.165
Beyond being subject to the laws of the United States, a
defendant must also be subject to the authority of the court in
which the suit is brought. Courts in the United States require
both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.166 Courts apply the
“minimum contacts” test to find personal jurisdiction.167 But, in
order to obtain subject matter jurisdiction in securities suits with
161. Cont’l Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 420–21
(8th Cir. 1979) (discussing the court’s concern with fraud perpetrated in part from
within United States).
162. See id. at 420; Buxbaum, supra note 118, at 281 (“[P]laintiffs had presented a
plausible argument that this type of harm would be insufficiently deterred if foreign
purchasers could not litigate their claims in United States courts.”).
163. See Buxbaum, supra note 118, at 282 (“[I]t makes little sense to suggest that
the effects of fraud can be territorially segregated.”); Schapiro Speech, supra note 45
(“[B]ecause our sovereign power cannot cross borders with as much ease, fraud often
gets a head start on our enforcement efforts.”).
164. See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 987 (“Here the final prospectus emanated from a
foreign source, London or Brussels in the case of the Drexel offering, Toronto in the
case of the Crang offering, and apparently the Bahamas and Geneva in the case of the
IOB offering.”).
165. See id. at 993 (listing when federal antifraud securities laws apply).
166. See generally World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)
(discussing jurisdictional requirements).
167. See generally id. (discussing the concept and application of minimum contacts).
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international parties, U.S. courts can apply either or both the
conduct test or the effects test.168
Meeting these tests confers jurisdiction and satisfies the
requirement of territoriality, as the Eighth Circuit has
explained.169 The effects test is satisfied when substantial effects
of a foreign transaction are felt within the United States.170
However, these effects must be fairly direct to trigger
jurisdiction.171 The impact can be felt either by specific markets
within the United States or by individual U.S. investors.172
The conduct test is rooted in the important goal of
preventing the United States from becoming an exporter of
financial misconduct.173 It can be applied even if no harmful
168. See Fisch, supra note 159, at 542–43 (mentioning the alternate conduct or
effect standards for imposing jurisdiction); see also Colleen P. Mahoney, International
Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws, 1743 PRACTISING L. INST. CORP. L. & PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 861, 889 (2009) (discussing conduct and effect tests).
169. See Cont’l Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 420
(8th Cir. 1979) (“[F]inding subject matter jurisdiction after such an analysis is consistent
with the subjective territorial principle of international law.”).
170. See Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 261–62 (2d Cir.
1989) (“The anti-fraud laws of the United States may be given extraterritorial reach
whenever a predominantly foreign transaction has substantial effects within the United
States.”); see also Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribus
London, 147 F.3d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Congress would want to redress harms
perpetrated abroad which have a substantial impact on investors or markets within the
United States . . . .” (citing Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.
1968))).
171. See Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 262 (“[C]ourts have been reluctant to apply
[American] laws to transactions that have only remote and indirect effects in the United
States.” (citing Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326,
1334 (2d Cir. 1972)).
172. See Banque Paribus, 147 F.3d at 125 (“Congress would want to redress harms
perpetrated abroad which have a substantial impact on investors or markets within the
United States . . . .”); Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206 (“We believe that Congress intended
the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic
investors who have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect
the domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in
American securities.”). Bersch holds that the effects must be felt by individual investors
and that “generalized effects” are not sufficient. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 519
F.2d 974, 998 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that these generalized effects consisted of a loss of
investor confidence in the United States, both in the firm at issue and in the regulatory
system).
173. See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 987 (“Congress did not mean the United States to be
used as a base for fraudulent securities schemes even when the victims are
foreigners . . . .”); Plessey Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 628 F.Supp. 477, 494 (D. Del. 1986)
(“To prevent the United States from becoming a ‘Barbary Coast’ hospitable to
international securities ‘pirates’ who defraud investors, the exercise of jurisdiction by
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effects were actually felt within the United States, as long as the
requisite conduct was undertaken within the United States.174
Conduct within the United States must be more than merely
preparatory to satisfy this test.175
When the injury is suffered by foreign investors, the conduct
must also have been directly causal.176 In a Second Circuit case,
SEC v. Berger, the defendant was a partner of an offshore
investment fund designed to cater to foreign investors.177 The
Southern District of New York later found that the fund failed to
report losses. Berger unsuccessfully appealed the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction.178 The Second Circuit held that a “scheme
masterminded and implemented” from within the United States
met extraterritorial jurisdictional standards, even when the
relevant false information was disseminated by a foreign entity.179
Continental Grain Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., a case that dealt
with a purchase of one firm by another through a stock
acquisition where the purchased firm defrauded its purchaser,180
further developed the standard for causality under the conduct
test. In Continental Grain, the conduct sufficient for jurisdiction
from within the United States consisted of phone calls and
mailings from the United States when they were “necessary to
further the fraudulent scheme.”181 As these examples show, U.S.
American courts must be broad.” (citing SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir.
1977))).
174. See Cont’l Grain, 592 F.2d at 420 (holding that U.S. courts will “examine . . .
whether defendants conduct in the United States was significant with respect to the
alleged violation”).
175. See id. (“[C]onduct in the United States cannot be ‘merely preparatory.’”
(quoting IIT v. Vencap, Ltd. 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975))).
176. See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993 (stating that anti-fraud provisions “[d]o not apply to
losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside the United States unless acts (or
culpable failures to act) within the United States directly caused such losses”); SEC v.
Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that conduct must be more than
merely preparatory and directly causal to trigger the conduct test).
177. See Berger, 322 F.3d at 188 (noting that “Berger, along with two close friends as
partners, formed an offshore investment company” designed for non-U.S. investors.).
178. See id. at 190, 196 (holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction
because the “fraud [was] conceived and executed in New York”).
179. Id. at 193–94 (applying the conduct test to the facts of the case).
180. Cont’l Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 411–12
(8th Cir. 1979) (discussing the purchase transaction and the issues undisclosed to the
purchaser).
181. See id. at 420 (“Defendants conduct in the United States consisted of letters
and telephone calls which were necessary to further the fraudulent scheme and, in fact,
constituted the organization and completion of the fraud.”).
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courts have typically not been squeamish in asserting
extraterritorial jurisdiction under either the conduct or effect
tests.
Bersch, Berger, and Continental Grain deal with harm already
caused. But unlike private litigants, the SEC is permitted to bring
suit before an injury has actually been suffered in order to
prevent foreseeable harm.182 In carrying out its investigations to
determine which suits to bring, the SEC has certain privileges.
Any broker registered with the SEC, regardless of whether within
the United States or not, can be compelled to turn over records
without a subpoena.183 The SEC can also utilize U.S. courts to
informally ask a foreign court, to order persons, natural or
otherwise, within that court’s jurisdiction to disclose documents
to the SEC or to give testimony.184 Supplementing and enhancing
its international investigatory powers, the SEC has a range of
bilateral MOUs.
2. Requiring Extraterritorial Disclosure
Once U.S. courts determine personal and subject matter
jurisdiction, and a trial is underway, other international issues
may arise. Typically, courts permit fairly liberal discovery for
entities with relevant documents in overseas jurisdictions.185 U.S.
182. See Berger, 322 F.3d at 193 (“The SEC notes that, unlike private plaintiffs, it
may bring securities fraud actions prophylactically in order to prevent loss to the public
before it occurs and to protect the integrity of the stock exchanges . . . .”); Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 711 (6th Cir. 1985) (“Unlike private litigants seeking
damages, the Commission is not required to prove that any investor actually relied on
the misrepresentations or that the misrepresentations caused any investor to lose
money.”).
183. See Mahoney, supra note 168, at 890 (“[A] non-resident broker-dealer who is
registered with the Commission under Section 15(b) of the Exchange Act can be
required to produce its books and records to the SEC without a subpoena.”); SEC, DIV.
OF TRADING & MKTS, GUIDE TO BROKER-DEALER REGISTRATION (2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/bdguide.htm#VII (listing requirements for
broker-dealers).
184. See Mahoney, supra note 168, at 891 (“The SEC may also ask U. S. courts to
send letters of request to foreign judicial authorities asking those authorities to compel
disclosure and testimony by individuals and companies within their jurisdictions.”); SEC,
Int’l
Enforcement
Assistance
Site
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/
oia_crossborder.shtml [hereinafter SEC Enforcement Site] (listing other enforcement
mechanisms available to the SEC, including “formal letters rogatory between a U.S.
court and foreign judicial authorities”).
185. See Philip O. Erwin, The International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of
1990: Increasing International Cooperation in Extraterritorial Discovery?, 15 B.C. INT’L &
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courts issuing such disclosure orders, however, may come into
conflict with foreign secrecy and non-disclosure laws—potentially
putting litigant parties in a position of having to choose between
violating the court order or breaking foreign law. Even in these
cases, however, U.S. judges usually require the production of
documents, unless certain good-faith criteria are met by the party
claiming impossibility of performance.186
The 1958 U.S. Supreme Court case Société Internationale v.
Rogers, in which a Swiss holding company sued the U.S. Attorney
General to reclaim property improperly seized during World War
II, first laid out the standards for imposing extraterritorial
discovery in the face of conflicting foreign laws.187 In this case,
the trial court had dismissed the suit on the grounds that the
complaining party had failed to produce required documents in
Switzerland.188 The decision was appealed on the grounds that
such production would violate Swiss banking and economic
espionage laws which carried criminal sanctions, including
imprisonment, for persons held responsible.189 Around the same
time, the Swiss authorities, aware of the U.S. suit, interceded to
confiscate the documents.190 The Court noted that the firm had
COMP. L. REV. 471, 477 (1992) (“In dealing with foreign obstacles to extraterritorial
discovery, U.S. courts have most often resolved conflicts between domestic and foreign
law in favor of the former.”); Fisch, supra note 159, at 523 (“Traditionally the United
States has viewed its jurisdiction expansively and imposed it regulations on transactions
that may be viewed as essentially foreign.”).
186. See Société Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 211–12 (1958) (discussing how plaintiff’s attempts to
comply with disclosure did not exempt it from disclosure requirements); Erwin, supra
note 185, at 477 (“The courts have reasoned that the SEC’s need for specific
information to pursue possible violators of securities laws outweighs the restrictive
purpose of conflicting foreign law.”).
187. See Société Internationale, 357 U.S. at 210–12 (spelling out the analysis for
determining good-faith effort on the part of party compelled to disclose); Erwin, supra
note 185, at 477–78 (“In Société Internationale, the Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether sanctions were appropriate where the plaintiff had failed to comply with a
discovery request for documents on the grounds that doing so would violate Swiss
banking law.”).
188. See Société Internationale, 357 U.S. at 201–02 (listing the trial court’s reasoning
in dismissing the complaint after the failure to produce Swiss documents).
189. See id. at 204 (“Swiss penal laws did in fact limit petitioner’s ability to satisfy the
production order because of the criminal sanctions to which those producing the
records would have been exposed.”).
190. See id. at 210 (“During this period the Swiss Federal Attorney . . . ‘confiscated’
the Sturzenegger records.”). The confiscation amounted to forbidding the transmittal of
the documents, but the documents themselves were not physically confiscated. See id. at
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undertaken “extensive efforts” to comply with the order and that
the firm’s “inability [was] fostered neither by its own conduct nor
by circumstances within its control.”191
This focus on good faith was carried forward into later
decisions by the U.S. circuit courts. In United States v. First
National City Bank, the defendant corporation appealed a
decision holding it in contempt after it disclosed subpoenaed
documents available in the United States, but excluded
information located in Germany.192 The Second Circuit’s ruling
in First National City Bank advocated an important role for comity,
stating that “the mere absence of criminal sanctions abroad
[does not] necessarily mandate[] obedience to a subpoena.”193
Instead it was held that courts should work to balance the
competing interests of the foreign state and the United States,
even while stating that the U.S. interest in subpoena enforcement
was particularly strong.194
A later Second Circuit case involving a kickback scheme
utilizing foreign bank accounts, United States v. Davis,195 reiterated
the same concerns: balancing interests, taking into consideration
strong U.S. interest and possible foreign state intervention, and

200–01 (“This ‘confiscation’ left possession of the records in Sturzenegger and
amounted to an interdiction on Sturzenegger’s transmission of the records to third
persons.”).
191. Id. at 211.
192. See United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 898 (2d Cir. 1968)
(“Citibank complied with the subpoena insofar as it called for the production of
material located in New York but failed to produce or divulge any documents reposited
in Frankfurt.”).
193. See id. at 902 (“We would be reluctant to hold, however, that the mere absence
of criminal sanctions abroad necessarily mandates obedience to a subpoena.”).
194. See id. (“Such a rule would show scant respect for international comity; and, if
this principle is valid, a court of one country should make an effort to minimize possible
conflict between its orders and the law of a foreign state affected by its decision.”). In
this case the fact that neither the United States nor the foreign government had issued
any kind of statement about the matter and its impact on state relations was held to
indicate that neither state believed it was a very important matter for their national
public policies. See id. at 904 (“[I]t is noteworthy that neither the Department of State
nor the German Government has expressed any view on this case or indicated that,
under the circumstances present here, enforcement of the subpoena would violate
German public policy or embarrass German-American relations.”).
195. See United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1026 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating the
scheme “involved the payment of multi-million dollar kickbacks to executives of General
Dynamics Corporation in return for the approval of subcontracts awarded by General
Dynamics”).
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the desire to avoid using foreign laws to shield criminal activity.196
The Restatement of Foreign Relations proposes that “[w]here
two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of
law[,]”197 and the states’ rules are inconsistent, the courts should
consider: (1) competing interests of the states; (2) the hardship
imposed on the party; (3) how much conduct must occur in the
foreign territory; (4) the party’s nationality; and (5) the relation
between enforcement and the objectives of the applied rule.198
The U.S. courts’ approach towards extraterritorial
jurisdiction means that circumstances forcing the courts to refuse
to hear securities cases with international components are
narrow, though there are situations in which U.S. courts will not
always be able to hear cases involving transnational securities
conduct. Similarly, U.S. courts seem, in general, unimpressed
with foreign parties’ attempts to escape disclosure obligations
through foreign secrecy laws, unless fairly stringent good-faith
requirements are met.
B.

The MOU: Soft Law for a Hard Problem

The SEC has made extensive use of MOUs and has broad
powers to facilitate productive MOU arrangements with foreign
regulators. The Office of International Affairs is an entire
department within the SEC that deals exclusively with
international cooperation matters.199 This office sends out over
500 requests for assistance annually to foreign financial
regulators and receives around 400 itself.200 The MOU is the
196. See id. at 1035 (stating that courts should “strike a careful balance between the
competing national interests and the extent to which these interests would be impinged
upon by the order.”).
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 40 (1965).
198. See id. (listing considerations for the imposition of one state’s laws).
199. See SEC, Office of International Affairs, http://sec.gov/about/offices/
oia.shtml (last modified Jan. 20, 2010) (stating the role of the Office of International
Affairs as “promot[ing] investor protection and cross-border securities transactions by
advancing international regulatory and enforcement cooperation, promoting the
adoption of high regulatory standards worldwide, and formulating technical assistance
programs to strengthen the regulatory infrastructure in global securities markets.”).
200. See Mahoney, supra note 168, at 892 (“In fiscal year 2008, the staff made 556
requests to foreign regulators for enforcement assistance and responded to 454 requests
for foreign assistance from foreign regulators.”); SEC Enforcement Site, supra note 184
(“In fiscal year 2008, the SEC made 594 requests to foreign authorities for enforcement
assistance and responded to 414 requests from foreign authorities.”).
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primary means through which the SEC structures these requests
and the response procedure.201
Currently the SEC has MOUs active in over twenty countries,
though this represents agreements with more than twenty
regulators.202 The SEC is statutorily authorized to investigate in
the United States on behalf of foreign regulators, and in doing
so, may compel testimony or disclosure, even from entities not
regulated by the SEC.203 The International Securities
Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1990 expanded the SEC’s
powers to include keeping information obtained from foreign
regulators confidential.204 This includes information received
through MOUs.
The SEC’s bilateral MOUs and the MMOU are closely
related. Like the IOSCO MMOU, bilateral SEC MOUs are not
binding on the parties.205 The bilateral MOUs’ primary use is
providing a framework for voluntary cooperation, much like the
MMOU.206 The similarity is intentional—most MOUs concluded
by the SEC predate the IOSCO MMOU, and the MMOU was

201. See Mahoney, supra note 168, at 892–93 (“These MOUs and cooperative
arrangements cover most major foreign securities markets.”); Bryan Thomas Shipp,
Comment, Filling Gaps in European Union Securities Law: Contractually Organized
Supervision & the College of Euronext Regulators, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 387, 407 (2008)
(“Cooperation between national securities regulators has traditionally taken place via
memoranda of understanding (‘MOUs’).”).
202. See SEC, Cooperative Arrangements with Foreign Regulators, http://sec.gov/
about/offices/oia/oia_cooparrangements.shtml (last modified Jan. 20, 2010)
[hereinafter SEC Cooperative Agreements] (listing all MOUs signed by the SEC). For
example, the U.S.-Canada MOU is more specifically between the SEC, the Ontario
Securities Commission, the Commission des Valeurs Mobilieres du Quebec, and the
British Columbia Securities Commission. See Memorandum of Understanding, U.S.Can., Jan. 7, 1988, available at http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/
canada.pdf [hereinafter Canada MOU].
203. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(2) (2009)
(authorizing the SEC to assist foreign regulators in their investigations).
204. See International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act, Pub. L. No. 101550, 104 Stat. 2713, 2715 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78x(d) (1990)) (creating
FOIA exemption to ensure confidentiality of exchanges with non-U.S. financial
regulators).
205. See Mahoney, supra note 168, at 893 (“MOUs and cooperative arrangements
are generally non-binding agreements.”); Shipp, supra note 201, at 415 (“[N]on-binding
MOUs facilitate cooperation between regulatory authorities”).
206. See Mahoney, supra note 168, at 892–93 (“[MOUs] in many cases establish
procedures for sharing informational and providing enforcement assistance.”); see
Shipp, supra note 201, at 418–19 (“MOUs are generally confined to information sharing
efforts and do not contemplate actual enforcement.”).
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modeled on those agreements.207 MOUs concluded by the SEC
since the implementation of the MMOU in 2002 are considered
supplementary to its provisions.208 Numerous agreements
predating the MMOU, however, have remained in effect between
the SEC and foreign regulators.209
The MOU’s place within international law, or rather its lack
thereof, is important to its prospects for effectiveness. As a form
of soft international law,210 the MOU avoids lengthy treaty
processes that could involve numerous financial non-experts and
political machinations; it is also particularly well suited for the
flexible and quick approach necessary in international securities
regulation.211 As soft law agreements such as MOUs proliferate,
however, they can move norms into greater alignment, which
may culminate in a shift to hard law—either through a treaty or
an acknowledgement of a customary international law.212

207. See SEC Cooperative Agreements, supra note 202 (listing all MOUs signed
since 1987, including ones signed since 2002 with Germany, Switzerland, and Japan).
208. See Mahoney, supra note 168, at 893 (“[T]he SEC currently views bilateral
agreements as supplementary to the IOSCO multilateral MOU.”); Coop Factsheet, supra
note 75 (“[T]he SEC considers these bilateral arrangements to be an excellent
supplement to the information sharing mechanism of the IOSCO MMOU.”). MOUs
signed since the 2002 MMOU include those with Germany, Japan, and Switzerland. See
Cooperative Agreements, supra note 202 (listing all MOUs signed since 1987).
209. See Cooperative Agreements, supra note 202 (showing that the oldest MOU is
from 1987).
210. See Karmel & Kelly, supra note 72, at 884, 913 (“Indeed, the SEC, an
independent regulatory agency, negotiates and utilizes memoranda of
understanding . . . which are treaty-like agreements, but are soft law.”); Richard L.
Williamson, Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in Multilateral Arms Control: Some
Compliance Hypotheses, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 59, 63 (2003) (“[S]oft law is nonbinding . . . .”).
211. See Karmel & Kelly, supra note 72, at 890–91 (“Neither treaty law nor
customary international law can provide the speed, flexibility, and expertise that
international securities regulation requires.”); Williamson, supra note 210, at 63
(“Diplomats and their governments sometimes prefer concluding soft law instruments
because doing so can be easier than adopting treaties.”); see also Mahoney, supra note
168, at 893 (“MOUs and cooperative arrangements are generally non-binding
agreements . . . .”); Shipp, supra note 201, at 415 (“[N]on-binding MOUs facilitate
cooperation between regulatory authorities . . . .”).
212. See Christopher C. Joyner, Recommended Measures Under the Antarctic Treaty:
Hardening Compliance with Soft International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 401, 425 (1998)
(discussing how soft law ATCM agreement shifted norms regarding Antarctica); Karmel
& Kelly, supra note 72, at 894, 938 (“Soft law sometimes hardens into binding treaty
law . . . after soft law moves normative positions far enough that States are willing to
make a hard law commitment in a form of agreement already recognized as
constitutionally acceptable.”).
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Soft law arrangements highlight the fact that cooperation is
more likely when the benefits of compliance are significant.213
Parties rely on neither the actual document, nor any
consequences detailed therein, to secure coordination.214
Instead, convergent interests make cooperation more likely.215
The structure of MOUs has not significantly changed since
they came into existence in the 1980s. They are intended to
provide a framework for cooperation without forcibly mandating
that cooperation. Since the SEC’s bilateral MOUs are all very
similar, examples from each category illustrate those central
provisions unique to each group. This Note will use the
Argentine MOU as a representative example of an enforcement
cooperation MOU; the United Kingdom MOU as representative
of a regulatory cooperation MOU; and the Egyptian MOU as
representative of a technical assistance MOU.
1. Enforcement Cooperation MOUs
Enforcement cooperation MOUs focus on enforcement
assistance, though many of their provisions are common to
MOUs in the other two categories. The MOU between the SEC
and Argentina’s Comisiόn Nacional de Valores was concluded in
1991.216 Both parties are expected to assist each other to the full
extent provided in the MOU, within the bounds of their
respective domestic constraints.217 Information can be requested
213. See Karmel & Kelly, supra note 72, at 897 (“[C]ompliance stems less from the
written agreement and more from the compliance benefits or recognition that the rules
contained in those treaties are legitimate.”); Williamson, supra note 210, at 74-76
(outlining circumstances where there is not likely to be a gap in compliance between
hard and soft law arrangements).
214. See Karmel & Kelly, supra note 72, at 897 (“[Soft law] may be developed
through resolutions, practices, aspirational agreements, and the promulgation of norms
in various forms that guide behavior.”); Williamson, supra note 210, at 63 (stating that
soft law avoids domestic legal requirements associated with treaties and other hard law).
215. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
216. See Memorandum of Understanding On Consultation, Technical Assistance
and Mutual Assistance for the Exchange of Information, U.S.-Arg., Dec. 9, 1991, available
at http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/argentina.pdf [hereinafter Argentina
MOU].
217. See id. art. III, § 1(1) (“To the extent permitted by the laws and regulations of
their respective States, the Authorities will provide the fullest measure of mutual
assistance, as contemplated by this Article.”). When legal constraints are relevant, the
requested authority is supposed to use “all reasonable efforts” to assist. Id. art. III, § 1(3)
(“Subject to such limitations of legal authority, the Authorities will use all reasonable
efforts to obtain the authorization, or the assistance of such other governmental
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for numerous reasons, including “market oversight functions,”
“enforcement of the laws or regulations applicable to securities
markets,” “examination of investment businesses,” and
“investigations . . . where information [is] located within the
jurisdiction” of the requested regulator.218
Under the MOU, the following kinds of assistance, among
others, may be given by the requested regulator: “(a) providing
access to information in the files of the requested [regulator];
(b) taking testimony and statements of persons; (c) obtaining
information and documents from persons; and (d) conducting
compliance inspections or examinations of investment
businesses, securities processing businesses or securities
markets.”219
The Argentine or U.S. regulator can also deny a request for
assistance:
(a) where the request would require the requested
[regulator] to act in a manner that would violate the laws of
the [s]tate of the requested [regulator];
(b) where the request is not in accordance with the
provisions set forth in this [MOU];
(c) on grounds of essential public interest; or
(d) on grounds of national security.220
The MOU also creates an obligation to render unsolicited
assistance when a regulator discovers information that may be
relevant to the other party-regulator.221

agencies that have such authority, necessary to provide the assistance described in this
Article.”).
218. Id. art. III, § 1(1). It does not matter whether the conduct questioned by the
requesting regulator would constitute a violation within the requested jurisdiction’s laws.
See id. (“Such assistance will be provided without regard to whether the type of conduct
described in the request for assistance would constitute a violation of the laws or
regulations of the State of the requested Authority.”). However, if the requesting
jurisdiction’s laws specify that the target of an investigation be given access to counsel,
the requested regulator must attempt to provide counsel in its own investigations on the
behalf of the requesting regulator. See id. art. III, § 4(7)(b) (stating that if “the laws of
the State of the requesting Authority require the opportunity for counsel . . . the
requested Authority will use its best efforts to ensure that such an opportunity will be
given.”).
219. Id. art. III, § 1(2).
220. Id. art. III, § 2(4).
221. See id. art. III, § 8 (“To the extent permitted by the laws or regulations of their
respective States, each Authority will use reasonable efforts to provide the other
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There are restrictions on information obtained through an
MOU request. The information may only be used by the
requesting regulator for the purposes specified in the request.222
The requested regulator must be given an opportunity to object
to any unstipulated uses.223 Regulators are expected to keep
requests and their outcomes confidential, as permitted by their
respective domestic laws.224 When a regulator is forced to disclose
such information pursuant to its domestic law, it must notify the
other regulator and attempt to exempt itself from disclosure.225
Other MOUs are very similar. For example, the MOU
between the SEC and three Canadian provincial regulators also
states that the regulators will “provide the fullest mutual
assistance, as contemplated” by the MOU.226 It does not,
however, contain compliance inspections of financial entities as
available assistance between regulators.227 In 1986 the SEC
Authority with any information it discovers that gives rise to a suspicion of a breach, or
anticipated breach, of the laws or regulations of the State of the other Authority.”).
222. See id. art. III, § 5(1) (“The requesting Authority may use the information
furnished solely: (a) for the purposes stated in the request . . . .”).
223. See id. art. III, § 5(2) (“In order to use the information furnished for any
purpose other than those stated in paragraph 1 of this Section, the requesting Authority
will first notify the requested Authority of its intention and provide it the opportunity to
oppose such use.”).
224. See id. art. III, § 6(1) (“Except as contemplated by Section 5 of this Article, the
requesting Authority will not offer the information to, and shall use its best efforts to
ensure that it is not obtained by, any other person.”); see also International Securities
Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1990 [ISECA], Pub. L. No. 101-550, § 202, 104 Stat.
2713, 2715–16 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)(allowing the
SEC to keep information obtained from foreign regulators confidential). Congress
created a specific disclosure exception for information obtained through memoranda of
understanding. See id. (allowing the SEC to keep information obtained from foreign
regulators confidential); see also 15 U.S.C. 78x(d)(2)(B) (2007) (codifying part of
ISECA, specifying MOUs as valid vehicles for obtaining information that may be kept
confidential).
225. See Argentina MOU, supra note 216, art. III, § 6(3) (“The requesting Authority
will notify the requested Authority of any legally enforceable demand for information
prior to complying with the demand, and will assert such appropriate legal exemptions
or privileges with respect to such information as may be available.”).
226. Canada MOU, supra note 202, art. II, § 1.
227. See id. (failing to contain a provision to this effect). It is possible that this
measure was omitted from the U.S.-Canada agreement because it was an earlier
agreement. Alternatively, the SEC might have been concerned about the ineffectiveness
of the Argentine regulator when including the provision. The U.S.-Norway MOU was
also a later-concluded MOU and includes such a provision. See Memorandum of
Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation in the Administration and
Enforcement of Securities Laws, art. III § 1(1), U.S.-Nor., Sep. 24, 1991, available at
http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/norway.pdf (“The Authorities will
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concluded an MOU with the Securities Bureau of the Japanese
Ministry of Finance.228 This document is surprisingly short, with
the parties agreeing only to “facilitate each [regulator]’s
respective requests for surveillance and investigatory information
on a case-by-case basis.”229 However, a later supplementary
Statement of Intent from 2002 is largely similar to other bilateral
SEC MOUs.230 Other regulators with whom the SEC has signed
MOUs closely reflecting these core provisions include Israel, the
Jersey Isles, Mexico, Norway, and Portugal.231
2. Regulatory Cooperation MOUs
Regulatory cooperation MOUs spotlight communication for
both enforcement purposes and general developments relevant
to regulators. The MOU between the SEC and the FSA discusses
areas of cooperation with a focus on general regulator
considerations.232 The change in focus can in part be accounted
for by the fact that it was implemented after the development of
IOSCO’s MMOU.233 This MOU is therefore seen as a
provide the fullest mutual assistance within the framework of this Memorandum of
Understanding. Such assistance will be provided to facilitate the enforcement of the laws
or regulations applicable to securities markets and their members; . . . [and] the
inspection or examination of investment businesses . . . .”).
228. See Understanding on the Sharing of Information, U.S.-Japan, May 13, 1986,
available at http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/japan.pdf.
229. Id.
230. See Statement of Intent Concerning Cooperation, Consultation and the
Exchange of Information, U.S.-Japan, May 17, 2002, available at http://sec.gov/about/
offices/oia/oia_bilateral/japan.pdf.
231. See Cooperative Agreements, supra note 202 (showing all MOUs signed by SEC
and their actual texts, including those with Israel, the Jersey Isles, Norway, and
Portugal); see also Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Cooperation,
Consultation and the Exchange of Information, U.S.-Jersey, May 22, 2002, available at
http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/jersey.pdf [hereinafter Jersey MOU]
(containing many similar provisions to the Supplementary MOU between the Japanese
and the SEC).
232. See Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation, Cooperation
and the Exchange of Information Related to Market Oversight and the Supervision of
Financial Services Firms, ¶ 19, U.S.-U.K., Mar. 14, 2006, available at http://sec.gov/
about/offices/oia/oia_multilateral/ukfsa_mou.pdf (“The Authorities recognize the
importance of close communication concerning the global operations of Firms, and
intend to consult regularly regarding general supervisory developments and issues
relevant to the operations, activities and regulation of such Firms.”).
233. See id. ¶ 15 (“This MOU is intended to complement, but does not alter the
terms and conditions of the following existing arrangements concerning cooperation in
securities matters: . . . (ii) the IOSCO [MMOU], to which the SEC and FSA are
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complement to the MMOU (and other previous cooperative
agreements).234 The two regulators undertake to:
inform [each] other . . . in advance of: a) pending regulatory
changes that may have a significant impact on the
operations, activities or reputation of a [f]irm, in the other
jurisdiction; and b) any material event that could adversely
impact each other’s markets or the stability of a [f]irm, in
the other jurisdiction . . . .235

Each regulator also has the authority to conduct on-site visits with
companies that are either headquartered within either
regulators’ jurisdiction or regulated by both.236
Other MOUs concluded by the SEC explicitly state that they
are supplementary to the MMOU. The regulatory cooperation
MOU between the SEC and Germany’s Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) is one example.237 In fact, it is
largely identical to the FSA agreement.238
Bilateral agreements do not have to take the form of a full
MOU. Beyond their general MOU, German and U.S. regulators
have concluded a more specific supplementary agreement
dealing with the merger and subsequent oversight of German
and U.S. securities exchange holding companies.239 The
document states that “joint ownership . . . of [m]arkets alone will
signatories, which also covers information-sharing in the context of enforcement
investigations.”).
234. See id.
235. Id. ¶ 20.
236. See id. ¶ 23 (listing requirements for on-site visits). The regulator must notify
the “Host [Regulator]” before such a visit. Id. ¶ 24(a) (requiring the lnspecting
Authority to “notify the Host Authority of its intent to conduct an On-Site Visit”).
237. See Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation, Cooperation
and the Exchange of Information Related to Market Oversight and the Supervision of
Financial Services Firms, ¶ 16, U.S.-F.R.G., Apr. 26, 2007, available at http://sec.gov/
about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/germany_regcoop.pdf (“This MOU is intended to
complement, but does not alter the terms and conditions of the following existing
arrangements concerning cooperation in securities matters: . . . (ii) the IOSCO
[MMOU], to which the SEC and BaFin are signatories, which also covers informationsharing in the context of enforcement investigations.”).
238. See id. arts. 1–8 (containing similar provisions to the SEC-FSA MOU).
239. See Arrangement for Consultation, Cooperation and the Exchange of
Information Relating to the Oversight of Affiliated Markets Made under the Supervisory
MOU between the US SEC and the German BaFin, U.S.-F.R.G., Apr. 26, 2007, available
at http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/germany_bafin.pdf (stating more
specific provisions, but also incorporating sections of the original MOU between BaFin
and SEC).
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not lead to mandatory registration of, or application of domestic
laws to, a [m]arket in another [regulator]’s jurisdiction or
companies listed on that [m]arket.”240 In addition, the heads of
the regulators agree to regularly meet in person in order to share
concerns specifically about the integration of the exchanges.241
Should the merged exchanges decide to harmonize their
internal rules, the regulators commit to “coordinate their
regulatory approval processes and . . . facilitate the development
and implementation of consistent rules.”242 The Swiss Federal
Banking Commission and the SEC have also issued an accord
concerning the same merger, as the German holding company is
itself held by a Swiss firm.243
3. Technical Assistance MOUs
Technical assistance MOUs focus on helping developing
financial centers promulgate rules and create useful regulatory
frameworks for their nascent markets. In 1996 the Egyptian
Capital Market Authority and the SEC signed an MOU oriented
towards aiding the development of Egyptian financial markets.244
This MOU briefly mentions enforcement cooperation and
contains a provision about periodic consultations “about subjects
of mutual interest and issues facing their respective markets.”245
The SEC also commits in the agreement to advise on: (1) “[l]aws
and regulations to protect investors;” (2) “[s]tandards for
offering securities;” (3) “[m]arket oversight and enforcement
240. Id. ¶ 10.
241. See id. ¶ 13 (“The Chairmen of the SEC, BaFin and ESA intend to meet
periodically to identify and discuss issues of regulatory concern to one or more
Authorities, and to identify and discuss at early stages the regulatory implications of
anticipated further levels of integration of the Markets.”).
242. Id. ¶ 16.
243. See Undertaking Relating to the Oversight of Affiliated Markets between the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Swiss Federal Banking
Commission, U.S.-Switz., Apr. 30, 2007, available at http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/
oia_bilateral/switzerland_sfbc.pdf (describing the ownership structure of the entities
involved).
244. See Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Exchange of Information,
Consultation and Technical Assistance, U.S.-Egypt, Feb. 11, 1996, available at
http://sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/egypt.pdf (stating the desire between
the parties to “establish a framework for cooperation in the enforcement of the
securities laws of the United States and Egypt and the provision of technical assistance to
facilitate the development of the Egyptian markets”).
245. Id. art. I.
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mechanisms;” and (4) “[s]ystems of supervision.”246 The SECRussian Federal Commission on Securities and the Capital
Market MOU expands these areas of advice and assistance and
includes, as topics for advisement infrastructure of markets,
“accounting and auditing principles” and educational programs
for Russian government officials.247 Technical assistance MOUs
have targeted states whose financial markets are beginning to
develop and which could use the guidance and support of
experienced regulators like the SEC.
C. The MOU as a Cooperative Framework
Hypothetical scenarios constructed by political theorists,
also known as simple game models, are useful in evaluating
MOUs as cooperative framework tools. The interactions arranged
for by MOUs at first glance resemble the simple game model
called the prisoner’s dilemma. In the prisoner’s dilemma, two
actors each independently and simultaneously decide whether to
cooperate or not cooperate (also termed “defect”) with each
other.248 These interactions take place in a system of anarchy,
meaning that repercussions for defecting actors are limited to
acts by the other actor.249 Each actor’s ultimate payoff from each

246. Id. art. II.
247. Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Technical Cooperation, Mutual
Assistance and Consultation, ¶ 4., U.S.-Russ., Dec. 6, 1995, available at http://sec.gov/
about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/russia.pdf. (expanding upon the Egyptian-U.S. MOU).
Several other regulators, including the Securities and Exchange Board of India, have
technical cooperation agreements with the SEC. See Cooperative Agreements, supra note
202 (listing all technical cooperation MOUs that the SEC has signed, including with
India).
248. See generally Stephen J. Majeski & Shane Fricks, Conflict and Cooperation in
International Relations, 39 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 622, 623 (1995) (discussing the prisoner’s
dilemma and variations); R. Harrison Wagner, The Theory of Games and the Problem of
International Cooperation, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 330, 330–32 (1983). The requirement of
simultaneous decision-making is more appropriate here than in other circumstances as
it is easy to imagine that at any time, a foreign regulator and the SEC have information
requests pending with each other. See supra note 200 (noting the large number of
requests the SEC makes and deals with annually).
249. See Joseph M. Grieco, Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation:
Analysis with an Amended Prisoner’s Dilemma Model, 50 J. POL. 600, 613 (1988) (“[T]he
anarchical context within which the states are operating is likely to induce a very high
level of caution in each.”); Majeski & Fricks, supra note 248, at 622–23 (explaining that
the assumption of anarchy in the international system means that states’ options are
constrained by the actions of other states).
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decision responds to the simultaneous decision of the other.250
The highest payoff available to an actor occurs if he defects while
his partner cooperates; the next highest payoff results from
mutual cooperation.251 A second-worst outcome is reached when
both actors defect. The least desirable outcome is for the actor to
cooperate while his partner defects.252
In an international securities enforcement environment, an
example of the most preferred prisoner’s dilemma outcome for a
foreign regulator would be if the SEC cooperated with the terms
of the relevant MOU by responding favorably to an information
request, and in turn the foreign regulator defected by denying
assistance to the SEC in contravention of the terms of the MOU.
In this way, the foreign regulator would be able to accumulate
information on securities issues within its own jurisdiction, while
reducing the likelihood that firms and individuals within its own
jurisdiction will get in trouble for violating another state’s
securities laws. The assumption of anarchy is perhaps more
relevant here than in other international situations, since MOUs
are not binding and dispute resolution procedures are limited to
the parties “engag[ing] in consultation . . . in the event of . . . a
denial by one [regulator]” of an information request.253
However, this is not as troublesome for the prospects of
cooperation as it might seem.
A deeper examination of the structure and operations of
particular MOUs reveals that this outcome is not likely. The
250. See Majeski & Fricks, supra note 248, at 622–23 (explaining that the
assumption of anarchy in the international system means that states’ options are
constrained by the actions of other states); Wagner, supra note 248, at 330 (describing
different models, including the prisoner’s dilemma, and how states’ payoffs are
structured).
251. See Majeski & Fricks, supra note 248, at 623 (“The logic of the game dictates
that it is individually rational for both players to defect . . . .”); Wagner, supra note 248,
at 330 (“First, [the prisoner’s dilemma] illustrates the general point that equilibrium
outcomes in noncooperative games can be sub-optimal.”).
252. See supra note 251 (discussing the structure of the prisoner’s dilemma).
253. Argentina MOU, supra note 216, art. 3, § 7. See Mahoney, supra note 168, at
893 (“MOUs and cooperative arrangements are generally non-binding agreements that
state the parties’ intent to exchange information and cooperate in securities violation
investigations.”). Although there are no official repercussions for defection, securities
regulators are agents of their larger state governments. As such, their costs and benefits
from either cooperating or defecting may be influenced by the attitude and policies of
their national governments. See supra notes 143–145 and accompanying text (discussing
larger political pressures exerted on government agencies).
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prisoner’s dilemma model has two critical shortfalls in accurately
predicting the interactions between regulators governed by an
SEC MOU. First, it does not consider the possibilities for
communication between the two regulators. Frequent
communication, in particular, “cheap talk,” or nonbinding
communications used to hammer out differences and voice
concerns, greatly increases the odds of successful mutual
cooperation.254 The MOU itself is a framework designed to
facilitate just this kind of cooperation. In fact, Michael Mann,
former director of the SEC’s Office of International Affairs,
stated that one of the most significant side-benefits of an MOU is
that it promotes a personal relationship between the regulators
within the SEC and those within foreign regulatory agencies.255
This greatly enhances communication.
Second, the simple prisoner’s dilemma model contemplates
only one iteration of the game, but in practice MOUs are
exercised repeatedly and often.256 Multiple iterations of an
interaction increase the likelihood of cooperation, since a
regulator knows that its own defection this time around will
incite retaliatory defection by its counter-party the next time
around.257 Relating this back to the original structure of the

254. See Majeski & Fricks, supra note 248, at 625 (stating that the “second form of
communication labeled cheap talk is costless”); Wagner, supra note 248, at 338 (“If
player 2 can decide more than simply whether to cooperate or defect, but can also
develop and communicate to player 1 a variety of retaliatory choices that influence
either or both a1 and a2, then player 2 confronts an additional decision problem.”).
Effective communication also allows the two regulators to bargain over the terms of
compliance and information sharing, which should result in a higher probability of
success in any scenario, but particularly ones where one of the regulators is facing
conditions that might induce it to not cooperate. See Grieco, supra note 249, at 618
(discussing how Tokyo Round outcomes were affected by bargaining (communication)
between actors); Wagner, supra note 248, at 342 (“Selection of one agreement over
another [by actors] must . . . be the result of bargaining.”).
255. See Telephone Interview with Michael Mann, Former Dir., Office of Int’l
Affairs, SEC (Oct. 28, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Mann Interview] (stating
that a significant side-benefit of an MOU is that it promotes a personal relationship
between the regulators within the SEC and those within foreign regulators).
256. See supra notes 168–200 and accompanying text; SEC, IN BRIEF FY 2011
CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 24 (2010) (listing requests between the SEC and foreign
regulators for enforcement assistance during the fiscal years 2006, 2007, 2008, and
2009).
257. See Majeski & Fricks, supra note 248, at 639 (“Not surprisingly, groups also
achieve mutual cooperative lock-in (defined as a situation in which mutual cooperation
is sustained from the nth iteration of the game through the final iteration of the game)
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prisoner’s dilemma, a foreign regulator defecting in an
interaction with the SEC may achieve the foreign regulator’s
most preferred outcome in the first iteration, but in the second
iteration will almost certainly realize the second worst payoff, or
even the worst payoff if the foreign regulator attempts to
cooperate while the SEC defects. By locking in to a cycle of
cooperation, the foreign regulator can ensure at least its second
most preferred outcome, mutual cooperation.258
Considering that MOUs promote communication and
contemplate iterated interactions, their prospects for success in
prompting cooperation within the prisoner’s dilemma
framework seem high.
D. Non-U.S. MOUs
Other states’ regulators have signed MOUs among
themselves. For example, China’s Securities Regulatory
Commission has been particularly active in promulgating
MOUs.259 The Chinese regulator has MOUs with most of the
major developed states and even Taiwan.260 India’s Securities and
Exchange Board has also been creating MOUs, recently signing
one with Dubai’s regulator.261 Other countries’ use of MOUs
more often when they can communicate.”); Wagner, supra note 248, at 333 (discussing
indefinitely iterated prisoner’s dilemma).
258. See supra note 257 and accompanying text; Majeski & Fricks, supra note 248, at
639; Wagner, supra note 248, at 333 (observing that the iterated prisoner’s dilemma
changes optimal strategies). This view of a regulator’s preferences may be overly cynical,
but a general ethos of effective enforcement for all probably spurs a large part of
cooperation. See Mann Interview, supra note 255 (explaining actual regulator
motivations behind cooperation).
259. See Checklist of the Memoranda between the China Securities Regulatory
Commission and the Overseas Regulatory Commissions, http://old.csrc.gov.cn/
n575458/n4001948/n4002030/4079126.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2010) (listing all
MOUs signed by Chinese regulators).
260. See id.; Taiwan, China Seal Financial MOU, CHINA POST (Taipei), Nov. 17, 2009,
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2009/11/17/233003/
Taiwan-China.htm (“The memorandum of understanding (MOU) on cooperation in
financial supervision across the Taiwan Strait was officially signed yesterday . . . .”).
261. See Sebi Inks MoU with Dubai Regulatory Agency, TIMES OF INDIA (Mumbai), Oct.
28, 2009, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/biz/india-business/Sebi-inks-MoU-withDubai-regulatory-agency-/articleshow/5173121.cms (“Market regulator Securities and
Exchange Board of India (SEBI) on Wednesday signed a memorandum of
understanding (MoU) with Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) for bi-lateral
assistance and mutual cooperation.”); Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Bd. of India, Sebi
Signs MOU with DFSA, Dubai, PR No.325/2009 (Oct. 28, 2009), available at

1852 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1800
speaks to the effectiveness of the form in encouraging
meaningful cooperation.
E.

The International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act

The International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act
(“ISECA”) was passed in 1990 in order to “strengthen
international cooperation in the enforcement of securities laws
and thereby enhance the ability of the [SEC] to prevent and
detect violations of US securities laws that are committed at least
in part abroad and whose investigation may require the [SEC] to
obtain substantial foreign-based evidence.”262 The Act greatly
increased the ability of the SEC to keep information obtained
from foreign regulators confidential by creating a Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”) exemption.263 Specifically, the FOIA
exemption applies to information obtained through an MOU
when, as ISECA states, “the foreign securities authority has in
good faith determined and represented to the [SEC] that public
disclosure of such records would violate the laws applicable to
that foreign securities authority.”264 By expanding FOIA
exceptions through ISECA to include MOU-obtained documents,
Congress gave the SEC an effective and helpful backdoor
approach to getting the information it needs to conduct its
http://www.sebi.gov.in/Index.jsp?contentDisp=SubSection&sec_id=25&sub_sec_id=25
(“Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) today signed a bi-lateral
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Dubai Financial Services Authority
(DFSA) on assistance and mutual cooperation.”).
262. H.R. REP. NO. 101-240, at 2 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3888 (stating
that a goal of ISECA is to “strengthen international cooperation in the enforcement of
securities laws and thereby enhance the ability of the [SEC] to prevent and detect
violations of United States securities laws that are committed at least in part abroad and
whose investigation may require the [SEC] to obtain substantial foreign-based
evidence”).
263. See id. at 21; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78x(d)(2)(B) (2007) (describing the FOIA
exemption in ISECA for exchanges with foreign financial regulators). Before the
exemption, the SEC found obtaining documents from foreign regulators covered by
foreign confidentiality provisions very difficult and often impossible. See H.R. REP. NO.
101-240, at 21 (“The Commission cannot provide assurances of confidentiality because
of its disclosure obligations under the Freedom of Information Act (‘FOIA’) or pursuant
to a third party subpoena” and the resultant harm to cooperative efforts); Jimenez, supra
note 64, at 298 (“In many cases, foreign secrecy laws and blocking statutes have
hampered SEC attempts to obtain witnesses and documentary evidence from abroad.”).
264. International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-550, title II, sec. 202, § 24, 104 Stat. 2713, 2715 (1990) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78x(d)(1) (2007)).

2010]

REVISITING THE SEC’S MOU

1853

investigations. Although U.S. courts have not been squeamish
about asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction, bringing a party to
trial has not proven a guarantee of complete disclosure. If a party
is able to demonstrate good faith efforts to produce the required
information, or if the other state’s interest is deemed
overridingly important, the party may avoid having to reveal the
information.
Although nonbinding, coinciding regulator interests should
serve to render MOUs effective. This is especially true
considering the provisions giving regulators the option of not
complying when doing so would violate their domestic laws.
MOUs’ general wording creates a framework for cooperation
that responds to these parallel interests and gives regulators the
flexibility to be comfortable agreeing to an MOU.
III. IMPROVED INVESTIGATION AT THE EXPENSE OF
DISCLOSURE
The SEC has used MOUs to effectively increase information
gathering through cooperation with foreign regulators. This
success comes in part from appropriate structuring as a soft-law
arrangement between individual regulators.265 MOUs are not
negotiated by the two regulators’ respective governments, but are
instead developed and signed by the regulators themselves.266
Unfortunately, significant study into the SEC’s actual requests
made pursuant to its MOUs, and the outcomes of those requests,
is hampered by FOIA exceptions created by Congress specifically
to improve the effectiveness of MOUs.267
Part III.A compiles the evidence that MOUs are effective
tools in promoting regulator cooperation. Part III.B suggests that
soft-law arrangements, like the SEC’s MOUs, are better suited to
inter-regulator coordinative arrangements than harder law. Part
III.C discusses the FOIA exception to disclosure of information
obtained through MOUs and how that exception impedes
meaningful information gathering about the SEC’s activities and
outcomes through MOUs.

265. See supra Part II.B (discussing soft law arrangements).
266. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing regulators’ independence in signing MOUs).
267. See § 202, 104. Stat. at 2715 (describing the FOIA exemption in ISECA for
exchanges with foreign financial regulators).
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A. MOUs Promote Cooperation
MOUs catalyze transnational interactions between
regulators.268 Although MOUs are not binding arrangements
purporting to require regulators to share information, they do
prime regulators to cooperate.269 By establishing procedures and
limits for information requests, and by promoting personal and
institutional relationships between regulators, the SEC’s MOUs
ensure that foreign regulating bodies know both what to expect
from the SEC and how they are expected to handle a response.270
As an agreement designed to facilitate communication, an
MOU can increase the possibilities of coordination between the
SEC and other party regulators.271 The SEC’s first MOU greatly
enhanced SEC access to Swiss records, even before the
confidentiality provisions in ISECA were passed.272 The fact that
information requests are typically not denied is a testament to
the effectiveness of the MOU framework. Such success is also a
result of an awareness within the SEC of which foreign records
will remain undisclosed under foreign securities laws, even
considering ISECA’s confidentiality stipulations.273 According to
Michael Mann, a convergence on the norm of enforcement, even
if the states and regulators disagree on the specific details, may
268. See Mahoney, supra note 168, at 893 (stating MOUs’ effect as “sharing
information and providing enforcement assistance in where [sic] key evidence exists
outside of the United States’ borders”); Mann Interview, supra note 255 (stating that
MOUs promote interpersonal relationships between regulators and prepare them to
cooperate).
269. See Jimenez, supra note 64, at 305 (“MOU’s are merely statements of intent.”);
Mann Interview, supra note 255 (stating that MOUs promote interpersonal relationships
between regulators and prepare them to cooperate).
270. See Jimenez, supra note 64, at 306 (detailing advantages of MOUs from the
SEC’s viewpoint); Mann Interview, supra note 255 (stating that regulators know what to
expect in cooperation structured through MOUs).
271. See Majeski & Fricks, supra note 248, at 624 (“One additional way to help
account for the unexpected presence of cooperation in international politics may be
found by enriching the neorealist theory of international relations and its attendant
game-theoretic formalisms to include communication.”); Wagner, supra note 248, at 338
(“If player 2 can decide more than simply whether to cooperate or defect, but can also
develop and communicate to player 1 a variety of retaliatory choices that influence
either or both a, and a2, then player 2 confronts an additional decision problem . . . .”).
272. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-240, at 5 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3888
(stating the significant benefits from the 1982 MOU between the SEC and Swiss
regulator).
273. See Mann Interview, supra note 255 (stating that denials are uncommon
because regulators can reasonably anticipate responses).
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also be contributing to the success of the MOU system.274 Perhaps
the greatest available evidence of the effectiveness of the MOU
framework regime is the promulgation of IOSCO and the
MMOU and the fact that the SEC has continued to sign
supplementary bilateral MOUs after the 2002 acceptance of the
MMOU.275 Other states’ use of MOUs supports this position.276
Taken all together, the growing use of MOUs suggests that the
agreements must be significantly useful in aiding the SEC’s
international investigations.
B.

Softer Law is Valuable

The flexibility provided by soft law arrangements is
advantageous to the parties involved in an SEC MOU. The option
to withdraw from the agreement without consequence, when
coupled with effective communication, tends to enhance
cooperative prospects.277 The nature of MOUs does not
necessarily require hard-law codification in any case. As purely
procedure oriented, information-sharing agreements that take
into account the particular sensitivities of foreign securities laws
through their own exemptions to disclosure and ISECA,278 MOUs
already seem particularly disposed to success. A hard-law
agreement between governments does not offer anything not
already putatively accomplished by MOUs.
In fact, a binding treaty obligation between the United
States and another state on behalf of their regulators could face
problems. Government agencies responsible for diplomatic
relations almost certainly have different objectives than securities
regulators, as their political mandate differs. In addition, any
binding treaty agreement runs the risk of reducing both
274. See id. (stating that regulators want to cooperate).
275. See Cooperative Agreements, supra note 202 (listing all of the SEC’s MOUs
including those signed after 2002); About IOSCO, supra note 63 (reviewing the activities
of IOSCO).
276. See supra notes 259–261 (discussing MOUs between foreign regulators).
277. See Karmel & Kelly, supra note 72, at 890–91 (explaining speed and flexibility
benefits of soft law); Majeski & Fricks, supra note 248, at 637 (“By providing a safe and
more valuable option, the withdrawal choice also reduces defection without eroding
cooperation to any significant degree.”).
278. See International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act, title II, sec. 202, §
24, 104. Stat. 2713, 2715–16 amending 15 U.S.C. § 78x (1990) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
78x(d)(2)(B) (2007) (describing the FOIA exemption in ISECA for exchanges with
foreign financial regulators).
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flexibility and the ability of the SEC to deal with foreign
regulators on a case-by-case basis.
C. A Confidentiality Roadblock
ISECA’s FOIA exception for documents obtained through
MOUs certainly has made cooperation between the SEC and
non-U.S. regulators more feasible.279 As the FOIA exemption
states, records obtained from foreign regulators are only covered
if the foreign regulator determines in good faith that disclosure
would violate its own confidentiality laws and conveys that
information to the SEC.280 MOUs are drafted to respond to this
power regarding confidentiality. For example, a typical SEC
MOU, signed around the same time as the MMOU came into
effect, provides that “[t]o the extent possible, the [r]equesting
[regulator] will notify the [r]equested [regulator] of any legally
enforceable demand for non-public information furnished under
this [MOU] prior to compliance, and the [r]equested
[regulator] will assert such appropriate legal exemptions or
privileges with respect to such information as may be
available.”281
Under this MOU framework, when the SEC receives a FOIA
request for information obtained from a foreign regulator, the
SEC should notify the foreign regulator of the request.282 The
foreign regulator then, in good faith, determines if the records
are subject to confidentiality provisions within their own
jurisdiction. That regulator then conveys that information to the
279. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-240, at 23 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3888
(“[U]nless an appropriate FOIA exemption is created, foreign securities authorities will
refuse to enter into MOUs with the [SEC].”).
280. See International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act, title II, sec. 202, §
24, 104. Stat. 2713, 2715–16 amending 15 U.S.C. § 78x (1990) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
78x(d)(2)(B) (2007) (describing the FOIA exemption in ISECA for exchanges with
foreign financial regulators).
281. Compare Jersey MOU, supra note 231, ¶ 16(c) (“To the extent possible, the
Requesting Authority will notify the Requested Authority of any legally enforceable
demand for non-public information furnished under this Memorandum of
Understanding prior to compliance, and the Requested Authority will assert such
appropriate legal exemptions or privileges with respect to such information as may be
available.”), with Argentina MOU, supra note 216, at art. III, § 6(3) (“The requesting
Authority will notify the requested Authority of any legally enforceable demand for
information prior to complying with the demand, and will assert such appropriate legal
exemptions or privileges with respect to such information as may be available.”).
282. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
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SEC, which in turn articulates that reason for withholding the
documents.
The non-binding nature of MOUs means that the SEC may
disclose as it chooses, though this would significantly hamper
future efforts to coordinate. According to the statute, the only
circumstances under which the SEC must disclose information
obtained from foreign regulators under an MOU is either when a
court orders it, but only if the underlying suit was instituted by
the U.S. government or the SEC, or when Congress demands
it.283
The determination made by the foreign regulator must be
in good faith; however, the SEC has stated that it assumes all
assertions made by the foreign party to be in good faith, unless
indications say otherwise.284 Foreign regulators are barred from
making sweeping determinations about confidentiality.285
Instead, determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis.286
In 1989, while contemplating ISECA, Congress seemed
receptive to arguments for expanding the reach of the FOIA
exemption beyond the SEC’s proposal.287 However, the SEC
defended the initial proposal, which was ultimately the one
included in the bill.288 As international investigations have
become more important in the two decades since ISECA was
passed, the FOIA exemption for MOU-obtained documents has
283. See 15 U.S.C. § 78x(e)(2) (2007) (stating that the FOIA exception does not
apply if the records are requested by Congress or by the court in a proceeding if
instituted by the SEC). Thus, the information is protected from disclosure in a suit by
private parties. See id. (stating that the FOIA exception does not apply if the records are
requested by Congress or the court if in a proceeding instituted by the SEC).
284. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-240, at 33 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3888
(explaining the importance of good faith in confidentiality determinations by the
foreign regulator).
285. See id.
286. 15 U.S.C. § 78x(d)(1) (2007) (stating “the foreign securities authority has in
good faith determined and represented to the Commission that public disclosure of
such records would violate the laws applicable to that foreign securities authority . . . .”).
287. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-240, at 33 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3888
(showing that Congressman Rinaldo asked whether the exemption should be made
“more broad”).
288. See International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act, title II, sec. 202, §
24, 104. Stat. 2713, 2715–16 (1990) (stating that “the Commission shall not be
compelled to disclose records obtained from a foreign securities authority”); H.R. REP.
NO. 101-240, at 34 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3888 (“The proposed
exemption would establish a clear standard for nondisclosure: whether the information
is protected by applicable foreign law.”).
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become increasingly relevant. It may be operating to exclude a
growing body of significant information from parties facing
investigation and possible prosecution by the SEC. The
exemption also shields the SEC’s international interactions from
meaningful public examination. Although the exemption is
clearly necessary to satisfy the interests of confidentiality, without
which the existence of cooperation would be questionable, a new
balance may need to be struck. The democratic values enshrined
and promoted within FOIA warrant a reconsideration of the
extent of these confidentiality provisions, especially considering
the overlap with enforcement exemptions also available under
FOIA.
CONCLUSION
The financial centrality of the United States is eroding as
other states begin to catch up developmentally and
technologically. Coinciding with the first clear signs of this U.S.
decline—beginning in the 1980s and steadily growing in
importance—MOUs allow the SEC to increase information
sharing with other regulators in order to combat growing
opportunities for foreign misconduct. As frameworks for
international cooperation, MOUs hold the promise of
successfully promoting cooperation. This is especially the case
considering the changes in the global financial market structure
and how these changes affect the prospects and arrangement of
successful cooperation. MOUs prime regulators to exchange
information in expected ways. Their soft law structure allows
them to embody the flexible and timely approach desirable in
securities regulation.
In the United States, however, the FOIA exception has
served to remove many actual operations of MOUs from public
scrutiny. As an important vehicle for the SEC to exchange
information with foreign regulators, an activity growing rapidly in
importance, a more meaningful and deep review into MOUs’
operation and true effectiveness is certainly in order. Until a
study is concluded by a body with the power to compel the
necessary disclosure, namely Congress, other factors will have to
suffice in determining the effectiveness of MOUs. The SEC’s
ambitious actions against foreign fraud and other violations and
its enthusiastic continued support for MOUs clearly demonstrate
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their ability to foster cooperation and enhance transnational
enforcement.
Although the U.S. Congress, in consultation with the SEC,
ultimately left the extent of the FOIA exception at the level the
SEC proposed, that level seems increasingly onerous.
Investigations into transnational conduct are increasingly
common, and responding to that conduct is correspondingly
more important. Admirable and important democratic values are
enshrined within the ethos that underlies FOIA; but exceptions
are warranted in balancing those values with the other goals and
responsibilities faced by society and government.
The FOIA exception operates to impose other states’
domestic confidentiality laws on to investigations and
information gathered by the SEC, sometimes in pursuit of
prosecuting U.S. citizens. However, the justifications are
reasonable and valid. The information itself is being surrendered
by foreign governments, or at least their agencies. In the interest
of meaningful justice, subjecting that information to
confidentiality restrictions is reasonable if a condition of the
information’s release is its confidentiality. This was Congress’
intention in passing the FOIA exception. The effect, as intended,
has been to create fewer “information havens” for suspect
individuals either operating from within the United States or
having effects on U.S. citizens.
Important justifications aside, the growing use and
importance of information obtained through MOUs, including
the IOSCO MMOU, mean that a progressively larger amount of
information used by the SEC in investigating U.S. citizens with
connections or interests abroad is confidential. This
confidentiality extends beyond the conclusion of an
investigation, even if charges are never pursued. It is incumbent
upon those with access to the information—Congress and the
SEC—to make the effectiveness of MOUs and the impact of their
resulting information public in a way that does not unreasonably
impair the relevant confidentiality provisions or enforcement of
U.S. securities laws.

